

# run 5



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


## Featured in this Issue

- \* **Rabaul** - Stepping up the Solomons. A *Carriers at War* scenario
- \* **Pavlograd** - Von Manstein's backhand blow. The last *Battlefronts* scenario
- \* **Fort Donelson** - Unconditional surrender! A *Decisive Battles* scenario



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# Run 5

## Issue 23

<b>Editor's Chance</b>	
Notes, Work in Progress. . .	2
<b>Book of the Quarter</b>	
Breakthrough!	3
Tactics in World War I	
<b>The Q Store</b>	
Have a Look at our Special Offers. . .	4
<b>Letters</b>	
The Controversy Continues	4
<b>Fort Donelson</b>	
Unconditional Surrender	5
<b>Pavlograd</b>	
Manstein's Backhand Blow	19
<b>Rabaul</b>	
Stepping up the Solomons	42
<b>The Last Blitzkrieg</b>	
Our Next Game Previewed	46



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Disk subscriptions are now available for IBM and Macintosh users. The cost is the same for all formats.

IBM users must tell us whether they prefer 3.5" or 5.25" format. If you don't specify a format, you will receive the 3.5" diskette. If you wish to switch disk subscriptions from one machine format to another, just let us know.

When we find the time, we intend to upgrade all the scenario disks from back issues into the new formats and allow new users to acquire them or current users to upgrade to them. We'll keep the cost as low as possible; it will depend on how much time it takes and how many scenarios we can fit onto a disk.

## Upgrading to New Machines

We have received a large number of requests from our users to upgrade a particular title from one machine to another. In response to this demand, we have decided upon the following policy.

Any title from our range may be upgraded from one machine to another for a cost of half the retail price of the new version. You must send us the original program disk and the front page of the manual from that game. We will send you a complete copy of the new version of the game.

For example, if you wish to upgrade a C-64 version of *Halls of Montezuma* to the IBM/Tandy version, you should send us the original C-64 disk, the front page of the manual and the appropriate cheque, money order or MC/Visa number.

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## EDITOR'S CHANCE

BATTLEFRONT R.I.P.

In it's day *Battlefront* was the best WWII computer game on the market. That original game and the others which used the *Battlefront* game system have been good sellers for SSG and it is a credit to the original design of Ian Trout and Roger Keating that *Battlefront* could last so long in a marketplace always after new products. Unfortunately all good things must come to an end. Our latest game, *The Last Blitzkrieg (TLB)*, represents a quantum leap over our older game system and consequently we have decided not to produce any new scenarios for *Battlefront*. The current issue of *Run 5* will be the last one to include an IBM scenario for the *Battlefront* game system. As soon as we are able we will be including additional scenarios for *TLB* with IBM disk subscriptions. We will continue to include *Battlefront* scenarios for Macintosh disk subscribers until the release of a Macintosh version of *TLB*.

WHEN IS A QUARTERLY NOT A QUARTERLY?

Sometimes I feel that the only solution to meeting *Run 5* deadlines would be to accelerate all the subscribers to fractionally less than the speed of light. The resultant time dilation would allow us to get *Run 5* out right on schedule. Failing this it has become necessary to resort to the tried and true SSG method of the excuse.

When I was hired as editor, my sole responsibility was to publish an issue of *Run 5* every three months. Since then *Run 5* has been allocated less and less of my time as I move into the rewarding field of game design and development. This reorganisation of my time has not entirely been an unconscious decision. Each issue of *Run 5* requires a brand new piece of cover art. Given our current game production schedule it is almost impossible to produce enough



top quality artwork to grace the covers of four issues a year. Therefore our publishing schedule for *Run 5* depends very much on when new games (and therefore new artwork) are being produced. Although we are unable to guarantee that you will receive four issues a year you will always receive at least three (and of course your subscription will still be for four issues).

As with everything we do here at SSC we are far more concerned with delivering a top quality product than we are with deadlines. We hope that you have noticed the increase in graphic quality over the last few issues. Hopefully we can continue to improve with each issue.

This brings me to the point of how *Run 5* will change over the next few issues. As you will have read above, from Issue 24 we will no longer be producing IBM *Battlefront* scenarios. This means that the space which was previously allocated to the data tables and article accompanying the *Battlefront* scenario will have to be filled by something else. I have initially decided that, along with previews and replays, I will write articles on aspects of military history not associated with that issue's scenarios. This will bring us more into line with the format of most boardgaming magazines. If any of you have any better ideas then, by all means write me a letter and suggest them.

Another matter arising from our decision to retire *Battlefront* is that all but the *Decisive Battles* scenario will be available only to disk subscribers. The amount of data required for a *Last Blitzkrieg* scenario is looking about the same as for a *Carriers at War* scenario, i.e. a lot. As with *CAW* we will not be including this data in the magazine. Therefore those people who have a 'magazine only' subscription may find it worthwhile to upgrade and get the disk with the scenarios.

#### IN THIS ISSUE

Our last *Battlefront* scenario looks at the German counterattack which halted the Soviet 1942-3 winter offensive. The most significant feature of the fighting

in Southern Russia from Stalingrad to Kharkov is the negative contribution made by Adolf Hitler. If the German commanders in the field had been able to exercise even the same amount of control which Stalin allowed his generals then the Wehrmacht would not have suffered the succession of near or actual disasters which it did. Luckily for the Allies (and that means us) Hitler's continual interference in military matters resulted in the loss of all the previous summer's gains.

The *Decisive Battles* scenario deals with the attempted breakout of Confederate forces from Fort Donelson on the Cumberland River. The failure of this breakout led to U.S. Grant's first capture of a Confederate army. Before the end of the war he was to capture two more complete southern armies. No other general, north or south could manage even one. The fact that a significant Confederate force was trapped in Fort Donelson was the fault of Albert Sidney Johnston, acclaimed before the war as the greatest living soldier. Johnston completely failed to live up to his promise in the year before his death at Shiloh.

In late 1943 the Allies were looking to advance further up the chain of the Solomon Islands. A landing was made at Empress Augusta Bay on Bougainville and the Japanese gathered a fleet together to oppose the Allied advance. The battles which took place around Rabaul and Bougainville, including a number of 'what ifs' are covered in this issue in a *Carriers at War* scenario from Lt Commander Richard Mater of the Royal Australian Navy.

Finally we include our first *Warlords II* scenario for IBM and Macintosh disk subscribers. The scenario, designed by Danny Hamilton, deals with a holy war in which the great religions of the world battle it out for domination of your soul. The crusades were never this much fun.

Continued on p. 48

## Book of the Quarter

*It is the next war and the first few weeks of fighting have resulted in some shocking developments. Increasingly efficient air defences have turned the skies into a no-fly zone and initial losses amongst planes and pilots have been staggering. At the same time hand held anti tank weapons have become so small and efficient that armoured vehicles have been driven off the battlefield. The infantry are facing each other in a bloody stalemate across Europe. With gains measured in thousands of casualties per mile no end appears in sight. A hypothetical situation to be sure, but what would you do? It's not easy, is it? You have just found yourself in the same situation as the generals of World War I and understandably you are having the same problems coming up with a solution.*

The development of tactics in World War I is seen by many as a barren topic. Many people are content to believe the absurd proposition that all First World War generals were fools. In reality, as the recently published *Breakthrough! Tactics, Technology and the Search for Victory on the Western Front in World War I* by Hubert C. Johnson documents, tactics began evolving in World War I almost as soon as the first shot had been fired.

Any study of the tactics of the First World War must necessarily begin by examining the expectations of the combatants as they entered the war. The Boer War and the Russo-Japanese War had shown what could happen if the defenders used extensive field works. However, in both these wars the attackers had broken the trench lines and prevailed. Hence the possibility of a trench deadlock was not entertained.

It was expected that combat would consist of a sort of neo-Napoleonic combined arms warfare. The infantry would advance in firing lines and traditional assaults, supported by quick firing field artillery. The cavalry would act as scouts before the main clash. Trench warfare was a natural development given the effectiveness of the firepower

Continued on p. 17



# THE Q STORE

## RUN 5

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## LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Last issue I replied at length to a letter from Richard MacRae on the subject of generalship in WWII. His latest letter appears below. Don't worry if you feel like you've just walked in half way through a movie, get a copy of Issue 22 and read the first exciting instalment.

Dear Mr Hand,

Hello again. I don't wish to make this into a debate, as editor you will always have the last word, but let me clarify a few points and then let the matter be judged by the fair minded research of others.

We in Canada are raised in the Patton cult. Television, news, books, movies, magazines, etc. in this country are dominated by American sources, views, and mythology. In my youth I saw Patton twice. Since that time I too have realised the truth of the situation. I don't think Monty won the war; I consider the Canadian Army to have been (over) staffed by basically oafish officers. The war was won in Russia, and the factories and mills of Detroit and Pittsburg. Stalin would have crushed Hitler without D-Day. I confess that my letter had a bit of Patton-baiting, as his supporters are always anti-Montgomery, as if Patton's reputation can only be sustained by denigrating that of the Field Marshal; as if for Guderian to be a great general, Manstein would have to be a schmuck.

Let me strip the polemic from my argument. SSG thinks Patton is a great general because of reasons a,b,c, and you use reasons x,y,z to identify a bad general which you apply to Montgomery. I tried to apply tests x,y,z to Patton and a,b,c to Montgomery to demonstrate that if you think Monty is bad, Patton is no better or if Patton is good, Monty is no worse.

Continued on p. 18



# FORT DONELSON

## 'Unconditional Surrender'

February 15th-16th, 1862

*A Scenario for the Decisive Battles Game System*

by Stephen Hand

*After Bull Run the Union needed a hero who would give them a victory. Perhaps the most unlikely candidate for hero was an untidy failed businessman by the name of Ulysses Simpson Grant. Nevertheless Grant was the only Civil War general, on either side, to capture an army intact on the field of battle. He achieved this three times, the first being at Fort Donelson on the Cumberland River in Tennessee.*

At the end of 1861 the Confederate cupboard in the west was bare. Albert Sidney Johnston had 50,000 men with which to defend a 500 mile frontier. Luckily for him the Union was relatively quiet. Forces were being organised in the north in a leisurely fashion and none of the Union commanders had grasped the fact that the Confederates were as raw as they were.

Johnston's first act as western commander was to secure his flanks. Earl Van Dorn was sent to the Transmississippi to co-ordinate the scattered commands in that area and Zollicoffer was assigned to defend the Cumberland Gap. Given the nature of the terrain this latter command was able to cover the entire area between Nashville and the Appalachians.

Johnston's immediate problem was therefore reduced to the 150 miles between Columbus and Nashville. At the outset there were less than 20,000 men available to cover this interval and Johnston was therefore energetic in recruiting and obtained a number of fine officers from the east.


By the close of 1861 the Confederate commander had managed to gather 50,000 men with which to oppose the 90,000 northerners poised to invade Tennessee. The most vulnerable point in the southern front was where the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers, following a parallel course, crossed the border into Kentucky. The Union had a large fleet of gunboats, unmatched by the South. These, being able to rapidly penetrate deep into the Confederacy posed an enormous threat to Johnston.

Before his arrival Johnston's predecessors had begun the construction of forts to guard the two rivers. Fort Henry was on the right bank of the Tennessee and Fort Donelson was on the left bank of the Cumberland. The two forts could not directly support each other, being 12 miles apart but were close enough so that a threat to one could see rapid reinforcement coming from the other.

Forts Henry and Donelson were badly placed on the northern border of Tennessee, resulting from a desire not to violate Kentuckian neutrality. Consequently Johnston's line bowed inwards


from Columbus to Bowling Green and between these two points he had surrendered the advantage of interior lines to the Union.

In order to cover his inadequacies Johnston exaggerated his strength and made sure that the Union was privy to all the appropriate pre-offensive martial rumblings. The strategy worked, successive Union commanders, including Sherman, were convinced that a



**Brigadier General John B. Floyd**  
*The senior Confederate commander in Fort Donelson*





grey horde was lurking in Tennessee just waiting for an opportunity to strike. The first action of 1862 was at the far right of Johnston's line. Zollicoffer had been ordered forward to Mill Springs where he could cover both Nashville and Cumberland Gap. Foolishly advancing onto the northern bank of the Cumberland River the Confederate general was faced with a Union army twice his size under George Thomas. When Crittendon was sent by Johnston to examine the Southern dispositions on the right he was appalled. Zollicoffer

risked annihilation and the Northern force was too close to allow a safe withdrawal across the river. Therefore when Thomas' force became split by a swollen creek during a period of poor weather Crittendon resolved to attack each Federal flank in turn. After initial success the Confederates ran into trouble. Several regiments armed with flintlocks could not fire in the driving rain. Even worse, just as the initial charge began to run out of steam Union reinforcement began arriving from across the supposedly unfordable

stream which had split Thomas' command. As the battle approached it's crisis Zollicoffer lost his bearings and attempted to give an order to a Union colonel who promptly shot him dead. The death of their commander was the last straw for many regiments and in a short space of time the whole Confederate army was retiring. Despite crossing the Cumberland successfully the force disintegrated with only a fraction of the original command assuming new defensive positions well south of the Cumberland. Thomas was unable to mount an effective pursuit because of the weather and his natural caution.

Meanwhile in Johnston's centre the Northern commanders had begun to stir. Halleck commanded the troops facing Johnston's left and when he began moving the Confederate commander naturally became concerned for the two forts covering that part of his front. Johnston's chief engineer, Tilghman had reported the poor condition of both Forts Henry and Donelson and work was ongoing to render them more formidable.


Halleck's subordinate on the ground was U.S. Grant, a former regular army officer turned failed businessman and an alcoholic to boot. Up to that point Grant had only fought one battle, an undistinguished affair at Belmont, and he showed no more promise than any of a dozen other officers.

As commanding officer of the district of Cairo Grant was looking for an opportunity to discomfort the Rebels. In late 1861 he asked Halleck's permission to conduct an operation against Forts Henry and Donelson. It was refused. Nevertheless Grant detailed General C.F. Smith to make a reconnaissance of the forts. Smith had been commandant of cadets during Grant's time at West Point and by a quirk of war found himself under his old student. Smith confirmed Grant's views of the practicability of a simultaneous campaign up the Tennessee and the Cumberland Rivers.

On January 23 Grant again asked Halleck for permission to attack the



# FORT DONELSON - Map



OPEN	ROUGH	RUGGED WOODS	STREAM
HEAVY WOODS	BRIDGE	FORD	CUMBERLAND RIVER
WOODS	WILDERNESS	ROAD	FRONT LINE
TRENCHES	FORT DONELSON	DOVER	



# FORT DONELSON - Brigades

UNIT NUMBER	1-127	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
UNIT I.D. (Full)	[9]	Brown	Graves	Porter	Heiman	Drake	Davidson	Maney	Baldwin	McCausland	Wharton	Head
UNIT I.D. (Abbr)	[3]	Bro	Gra	Por	Hei	Dra	Dav	Man	Bal	McC	Wha	Hea
UNIT SIZE	[3]	Bde	Bty	Bty	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bty	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde
MAP LOCATION	(x,y)	2,10	3,8	3,9	4,9	5,4	5,6	4,6	3,1	5,3	15,3	8,15
CORPS	0-15	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
DIVISION	0-39	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	3	3	3	0
ARRIVAL	0-95	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UNIT TYPE	0-3	0	3	3	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0
OBJECTIVE	0-23	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SMALL ARMS	0-31	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
ARTILLERY	0-31	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	2
TROOP STREN.	0-31	26	2	2	22	20	20	2	30	20	18	12
MOVEMENT	0-15	6	4	4	6	6	6	4	6	6	6	0
BATTERY STR.	0-15	0	6	6	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	10
SHATTERED	0-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
LEADERSHIP	0-7	3	4	4	3	4	4	4	4	3	3	4
COHESION	0-7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
EXPERIENCE	0-7	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	3	2	5
REGIMENTS	0-7	4	2	2	4	4	4	2	6	4	3	2
LIKELIHOOD	0-7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
UNIT NUMBER	1-127	12	13	14	15	17	18	19	20	21	22	23
UNIT I.D. (Full)	[9]	Guy	Green	French	Forrest	Oglesby	W.Wallace	Morrison	McArthur	Cook	Lauman	M.L.Smith
UNIT I.D. (Abbr)	[3]	Guy	Gre	Fre	For	Ogl	W.W	Mor	McA	Coo	Lau	MLS
UNIT SIZE	[3]	Bty	Bty	Bty	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bde
MAP LOCATION	(x,y)	4,7	4,5	4,4	2,3	7,0	7,1	8,3	8,6	4,13	5,11	6,11
CORPS	0-15	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
DIVISION	0-39	0	0	0	0	5	5	5	6	6	6	6
ARRIVAL	0-95	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UNIT TYPE	0-3	3	3	3	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OBJECTIVE	0-23	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SMALL ARMS	0-31	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
ARTILLERY	0-31	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TROOP STREN.	0-31	1	2	1	10	30	30	10	18	31	31	14
MOVEMENT	0-15	4	4	4	12	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
BATTERY STR.	0-15	3	6	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SHATTERED	0-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
LEADERSHIP	0-7	4	4	4	7	4	5	4	4	5	4	4
COHESION	0-7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
EXPERIENCE	0-7	3	3	3	6	5	5	5	5	4	5	5
REGIMENTS	0-7	1	2	1	4	4	4	2	3	4	4	2
LIKELIHOOD	0-7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
UNIT NUMBER	1-127	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	23
UNIT I.D. (Full)	[9]	Cruft	Thayer	Davis	Dresser	Taylor	McAllister	Gumbart	Stone	Welker	Richardson	Wood
UNIT I.D. (Abbr)	[3]	Cru	Tha	Dav	Dre	Tay	McA	Gum	Sto	Wel	Ric	Woo
UNIT SIZE	[3]	Bde	Bde	Bde	Bty	Bty	Bty	Bty	Bty	Bty	Bty	Bty
MAP LOCATION	(x,y)	7,8	4,5	5,17	2,3	8,4	8,1	9,3	5,12	6,12	7,10	8,8
CORPS	0-15	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
DIVISION	0-39	7	7	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ARRIVAL	0-95	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UNIT TYPE	0-3	0	0	0	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
OBJECTIVE	0-23	0	0	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SMALL ARMS	0-31	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
ARTILLERY	0-31	0	0	0	2	1	1	1	1	2	1	1
TROOP STREN.	0-31	30	30	18	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
MOVEMENT	0-15	6	6	6	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
BATTERY STR.	0-15	0	0	0	8	10	6	8	10	8	10	10
SHATTERED	0-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
LEADERSHIP	0-7	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
COHESION	0-7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
EXPERIENCE	0-7	5	5	5	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
REGIMENTS	0-7	4	4	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
LIKELIHOOD	0-7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7



# FORT DONELSON - Divisions

DIV. NUMBER	1-39	1	2	3	5	6	7
DIVISION I.D.	[9]	Buckner	Johnson	Pillow	McClermand	Smith	Wallace
CORPS	0-15	0	0	0	0	0	0
TYPE	0-1	0	0	0	0	0	0
ORDERS	0-2	1	0	0	1	1	1
OBJECTIVE #1	0-23	8	7	6	6	12	7
OBJECTIVE #2	0-23	0	6	4	0	0	0
LEADERSHIP	0-7	4	2	4	3	5	4
STAFF	0-7	4	3	4	3	4	4

# FORT DONELSON - Terrain Effects Chart

TERRAIN #	0-31	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
TERRAIN NAME	[11]	Cumb'land R.	-	Open	Woods	Hvy Woods	Rugged Wd	Wilderness	Town
SIGHTING VAL.	0-7	0	0	1	5	8	6	10	2
MOVEMENT	0-7	0	0	1	3	4	4	6	2
COVER VALUE	0-7	0	0	1	3	4	4	5	2
FORT VAL. (N)	0-7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FORT VAL. (S)	0-7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

TERRAIN #	0-31	8	9	10
TERRAIN NAME	[11]	Trench	Fort Donels	Rough
SIGHTING VAL.	0-7	5	5	3
MOVEMENT	0-7	3	3	2
COVER VALUE	0-7	3	3	2
FORT VAL. (N)	0-7	0	0	0
FORT VAL. (S)	0-7	3	6	0

two forts and once again Halleck dismissed him. "I was cut short as if my plan was preposterous." stated Grant who returned to Cairo "very much crestfallen". Such was Grant's confidence in the correctness of his plan that he continued to cable Halleck, on January 24 and again on the 28th, this time in conjunction with Commodore Foote, commander of the gunboats attached to Grant's command.

Halleck was one of the most cautious generals on either side throughout the entire war. He was, however, jealous and ambitious. When Buell's lieutenant, Thomas was victorious at Mill Springs Halleck became concerned

about his own standing as against that of Buell. Halleck rightly suspected that either he or Buell was likely to be given command of the entire western theatre. If Halleck had any choice in the matter the command would go to himself.

The day after the battle of Mill Springs Halleck wrote to McClellan suggesting an advance up the two rivers with the object of capturing Nashville. This was three days before Grant, pushing the very same scheme was turned away. Halleck claimed that at least 60,000 men would be required to take the two forts and requested the transfer of men from Buell. This was refused and so

Halleck relented and on January 30 gave Grant permission to "take and hold Fort Henry".

Grant had 17,000 men and was required to move his three divisions one at a time. The movement was carried out with the minimum of difficulty due to the presence of seven gunboats, four of them ironclads. Grant was initially unsure of how close he could land his divisions and so ordered the gunboats to make a reconnaissance. After the Essex was hit by a six inch shell it was decided to exercise caution. McClermand's Division moved first and was landed nearly ten miles from Fort Henry on the Tennessee River.

Grant's plan was quite simple, one division would advance up the east bank on which the fort was sited while the other would advance along the west bank and position guns on the high ground opposite Fort Henry. That the fort was so badly positioned as to be commanded by heights on the west side of the river was not the fault of Tilghman, the commander. In fact Tilghman had more than one reason to curse the engineers who had originally surveyed the site of the fort. No allow-



# FORT DONELSON - Objectives

OBJ. NUMBER	1-23	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
OBJ. NAME	[11]	Fort Donels	Dover	To Wynns F	To Nashville	To Charlott	Cherry Hse	Rollin Hse	Smiths Hill
MAP LOCATION	(x,y)	0,8	2,3	17,9	17,1	7,0	8,4	8,7	5,9
START (N)	1-95	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
STOP (N)	1-95	28	28	14	14	14	28	28	28
VPs/TURN (N)	0-255	10	10	1	1	2	1	1	3
VPs AT END (N)	0-255	50	50	5	10	10	5	5	15
MANEUVER (N)	0-15	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
START (S)	1-95	10	10	1	1	1	1	1	1
STOP (S)	1-95	28	28	14	14	14	28	28	28
VPs/TURN (S)	0-255	1	1	5	5	3	2	2	1
VPs AT END (S)	0-255	55	5	50	25	15	10	10	10
MANEUVER (S)	0-15	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

OBJ. NUMBER	1-23	9	10	11	12
OBJ. NAME	[11]	Trench 1	Trench 2	Trench 3	Smith's Line
MAP LOCATION	(x,y)	4,9	5,6	5,3	6,12
START (N)	1-95	1	1	1	1
STOP (N)	1-95	28	28	28	28
VPs/TURN (N)	0-255	5	5	5	1
VPs AT END (N)	0-255	25	25	25	5
MANEUVER (N)	0-15	0	0	0	0
START (S)	1-95	1	1	1	1
STOP (S)	1-95	28	28	28	28
VPs/TURN (S)	0-255	1	1	1	3
VPs AT END (S)	0-255	10	10	5	15
MANEUVER (S)	0-15	0	0	0	0

ance had been made for the winter floods which were causing the river to rise continuously. Six guns were already underwater and the water continued to rise. In fact it was only a matter of time before the entire fort became unusable.

Tilghman watched as the Union transports unloaded their human cargo and left, only to return with even more men. The garrison of Fort Henry totalled 3400 men and even these did not have sufficient small arms. It became apparent that there could only be one result when the attack commenced. Tilghman decided that the only correct course of action was to save his infantry and so, on the morning of February 6 the entire garrison, with the exception of Tilghman, two officers and 54 men marched over to Fort Donelson.

Grant intended to attack that morning and at 11AM his two divisions began their advance on either side of the river. One hour later, having given the footsloggers a head start, the gunboats began their move towards the fort. At 1700 yards Commodore Foote opened fire, with as many guns, 54 as the Confederates had gunners. While the ironclads closed the range the wooden gunboats remained where they were.

Only nine functional guns remained in Fort Henry but they did magnificent service. Foote's flagship was struck 32 times and the unfortunate Essex was struck in the boiler, disabling her. The

# FORT DONELSON - Artillery

ARTILLERY #	1-31	1	2
ARTILLERY I.D.	[11]	Napoleon	3" Rifle
RANGE	0-5	4	5
RATE OF FIRE	0-7	4	3
EFFECT'NESS	0-7	5	4
PENETRATION	0-7	2	4

# Small Arms

SMALL ARMS #	1-31	1	2
SM. ARMS I.D.	[11]	Rifle Mus	Carbine
RANGE	0-1	1	1
FIRE VALUE	0-7	5	4
MELEE VALUE	0-7	6	6



# Armies

SIDE	N/S	SOUTH	NORTH
COMMANDER	[9]	Floyd	Grant
SECOND I.C.	[9]	Pillow	-
ARMY I.D.	[11]	Rebs	Union
	[11]	-	Army
MAP LOCATION	(x,y)	3,5	5,17
ARRIVAL	0-95	0	6
OFF. OBJ. #1	0-23	4	9
OFF. OBJ. #2	0-23	6	1
DEF. OBJ. #1	0-23	10	6
DEF. OBJ. #2	0-23	1	4
MOVEMENT	0-15	7	10
STAFF	0-7	3	6
STRENGTH	0-7	2	2
LEADERSHIP	0-7	1	7

defenders did not have it all their own way though. The six inch Rifle burst, causing considerable loss of life and the only other really effective gun, a 128 pound columbiard was inadvertently spiked with a broken priming wire. After two hours of bombardment, with only four guns remaining in action Tilghman surrendered.

When Grant finally reached the fort at 3PM his men had been slogging up either bank for four hours without firing a shot. He was, however, quite unconcerned, the fort was his. The three wooden gunboats were at once dispatched to destroy the railroad bridge 15 miles upstream across which Johnston could transfer troops from one flank to the other. After quickly achieving their primary aim the gunboats continued south as far as Muscle Shoals, capturing and destroying any Confederate shipping they found.

For Johnston the fall of Fort Henry was a disaster. His left under Bishop Leonidas Polk had been severed from his centre with the destruction of the railroad bridge over the Tennessee. What options lay open for the Confederacy in the west with the way open into their rear and Grant certain to move on Fort Donelson?

P.G.T. Beauregard had just arrived in the west. He proposed that Johnston concentrate his forces at Fort Donelson, crush Grant and then deal with Buell. Johnston refused to contemplate this move which could mean the loss of Nashville. Containing the second larg-

est gun foundry in the South, Nashville was also a rural centre with access to thousands of acres of food and fodder. Uncovering the city to Buell's advance might place Johnston, after his fight with Grant, with a large Union army across his line of retreat.

Another option would be to give up Fort Donelson and Columbus, creating a new line echeloned back from Nashville. The idea of retreat was tentatively accepted by Johnston, and Beauregard was given the job of conducting the withdrawal from Kentucky into Tennessee. But Johnston, despite his reputation as the greatest living soldier, got hopelessly confused between one plan and the other.

Although he had resolved not to attack Grant at Donelson and he felt that the fort's capture was merely a matter of time, Johnston wished to delay Grant for as long as possible. He sent as many formations as were immediately available to Fort Donelson with the view to opposing Grant while it was practical and then slipping away as had the garrison of Fort Henry. It was the product of poor military thinking and was the first step towards a debacle.

As a series of brigades entered Fort Donelson one after the other the leadership changed a number of times. Brigadier-Generals, each one with seniority over the last entered the fort, Bushrod Johnson, Simon Buckner, Gideon Pillow and finally John B. Floyd. The last commander, Floyd arrived on the morning of February 14, eight days after the fall of Fort Henry.

Grant had originally intended to have taken Fort Donelson by the eighth but the strength of the position had delayed him. An initial reconnaissance on the seventh suggested that the wisest course of action would be to wait for the gunboats which had to make the circuitous journey down the Tennessee River to the Ohio and back up the Cumberland. In fact after consultation with Halleck who promised 10,000 reinforcements within the week Grant decided to allow Commodore Foote to have his ironclads repaired at Cairo.

Having received his first reinforcements by February 12 Grant decided to make a move from Fort Henry across to the Cumberland. 2500 men were left on the Tennessee in what remained of the waterlogged fort while 10,000 men were being transported by water.


With the remaining 15,000 Grant hiked overland and by mid afternoon he had begun the investment of Fort Donelson. Initially the lines were loose, McClernand's Division guarding the south and C.F. Smith's the north. As Grant settled down west of the fort the noise of gunfire across the water signalled the arrival of the gunboats.

In discussion with Foote Grant requested a demonstration against the fort on the morning of the 13th. Before this could be started McClernand launched a local attack against orders. It was bloodily repulsed. McClernand was an aspiring politician with little ability to match his ambition. Grant was to be plagued by McClernand's insubordination and grandstanding for



**Brigadier General Gideon Pillow**  
Lacking the moral courage to give the order to surrender Pillow held the command at Fort Donelson for as long as it took him to relinquish it





### **Commodore Foote**

*Like Grant the Commodore's greatest concern was to get the job done*

over a year until, at Vicksburg, the ex-congressman overstepped the line and Grant was able to sack him.

As McClernand's attack was ending the gunboat Carondelet steamed into view and began firing at the fort. Fort Donelson was better sited than Fort Henry had been. There were two batteries, the upper one being at the top of a hundred foot cliff and the lower one being dug into the cliff half way down. The upper battery consisted of two 32 pound carronades and a 128 pound rifle while the lower one was made up of eight 32 pound guns and a 10 inch columbiad. Only the two larger guns could be expected to damage the ironclads.

Sure enough as the Carondelet steamed towards the fort it managed to loose off 139 rounds and was undamaged until a solid 128 pound shot pierced the ar-

mour plate and entered the engine room. The Carondelet withdrew, as at Fort Henry the Confederate gunners had won the first round.

Along with the arrival of the gunboats came Grant's reinforcements. A new division was established and was placed under the command of Lew Wallace. Wallace's Division was placed on the western side of Fort Donelson, between the divisions of Smith and McClernand. Up until this moment the Union lines around the fort had been incomplete. From the morning of February 14 Fort Donelson was completely invested.


Just before the siege lines were extended Floyd brought his Confederate brigade within the works, seemingly anxious to be the last to enter the trap. And a trap it certainly was. With Grant reinforced to 27, 000 and possessing the

gunboats the likelihood of the Confederates escaping from Donelson, much less holding it, became remote. This was not some medieval fortress, stocked with enough provisions to last a season. Fort Donelson in the proper sense consisted of the two batteries, the surrounding earthworks were strong, but not impregnable. Most importantly the fort lacked food and fodder for the 17, 000 men in the trenches.

Grant knew the problems faced by the garrison and he intended to contribute as much to them as he possibly could. Unlike the assault on Fort Henry an attack by the gunboats would only be the first move in the reduction of Donelson.

Grant intended to have Foote's gunboats knock out the Confederate batteries and then take position opposite the town of Dover at the south end of the Rebel works. The gunboats could then aid McClernand's Division in the capture of Dover and Floyd would be cut off from the south and any possible source of supplies. The garrison could then be shelled or starved out of position. It was a sound plan but one which relied on the success of the gunboats.

At 3PM on February 14 the four Union ironclads advanced and rapidly closed the range to within a few hundred



### **Brigadier General Lloyd Tilghman**

*The commander of Fort Henry*



yards. Early on during the assault a Confederate gunner inadvertently spiked the 128 pound rifle with a priming wire, the same as had been done at Fort Henry a week earlier. It looked as if it would be a repeat of that other attack until a shell pierced the armour of the St Louis, Foote's flagship, killed the pilot and wounded the commodore. As the flagship floated aimlessly down the river the attack broke up.


It seemed to Grant that his only option was now to press a formal siege. He did not want to do this, he would require more men to make his lines secure against attack from inside the fort or from a relieving force. It would also take longer than he had been prepared for. There seemed, however, to be no alternative.

From the Confederate side the situation appeared completely different. It had never been Johnston's intention that Fort Donelson be held indefinitely. With the 17,000 troops needed elsewhere and supplies dangerously low it was left to Floyd to put Johnston's vague ideas of slipping away in the night into practice.

The problem was that the Federal lines extended almost all the way around the fort. In order to break out it would be necessary to attack a part of the Union line. In a conference between the three highest ranking officers, Floyd, Pillow and Buckner it was decided to attack McClernand's Division. This would uncover the road to Nashville down which the garrison would then proceed.

The night of February 14/15 saw the mercury fall well below freezing. The icy wind froze the soldiers of both sides and enabled the Confederates to assemble their attack force without being detected.

At dawn the attack commenced. After initial surprise the Union men recovered and a fierce firefight ensued. For two hours the southerners assaulted McClernand and for two hours the Federals stood and took the battering. By 10AM the pressure was too great. Oglesby's brigade began to run short



### *The Gunboat Conestoga*

*Converted from a commercial paddle steamer the Conestoga fought at both Forts Henry and Donelson*

of ammunition and started to give ground. Soon the entire Union flank was pulling back to avoid uncovering its right to Forrest's cavalry which was racing around attempting to get into the Union rear.

The refusal of the Union right flank achieved exactly what Floyd had intended. The road to Nashville was open. All that remained for him to do was to march his army to freedom. But at the moment of his breakthrough Gideon Pillow lost either his nerve or his wits. Pillow decided that he had won a great victory and after cabling Johnston to that effect he ordered Buckner to pursue the supposedly defeated enemy. Although Buckner argued vehemently in favour of the army withdrawing to Nashville Floyd eventually decided against making the attempt. Buckner was ordered to move down the Wynns Ferry Road in pursuit of Grant's army.

So what was Grant doing while his army was being attacked? Before dawn Commodore Foote had requested an interview with Grant before going back to Cairo to recover from his injuries. Grant rode north to the point where the gunboats were moored, giving strict orders for his divisional commanders to hold their positions and not to bring on an engagement. So it was that McClernand fought the morning's battle alone. Wallace was asked for assist-

ance and after trying to have Grant found and consulted he finally detached one of his brigades to McClernand. Unfortunately for the Union that brigade became swept up in the rout and saw no fighting during the course of the morning. The other brigade available to Wallace at this hour defended against Buckner's so-called pursuit.

Grant was on his way back from his meeting with Commodore Foote when he was found by an aide who informed him of the Rebel attack and the scattering of McClernand's Division. The Union commander raced back towards Fort Donelson where he was relieved to find Smith's Division awaiting orders. Riding on he found that Wallace's men had successfully repulsed Buckner.

Wallace was found discussing the situation with McClernand and he later commented on how untroubled Grant appeared as he came up. There was no thought of simply restoring the status quo. The morning of February 15 had been a tactical setback for the Union but Grant saw that the Confederates had shot their bolt. Perhaps unconsciously paraphrasing Napoleon Grant stated that "the one who attacks first now will be victorious" adding that "the enemy will have to be in a hurry if he gets ahead of me." As he passed





**John A. McClernand**

*Pictured here as a Major General McClernand epitomised the problems the Union had with political generals*

some of McClernand's demoralised men Grant shouted to them, "Fill your cartridge-boxes, quick, and get into line; the enemy is trying to escape and he must not be permitted to do so." The effect on the demoralised men was electric.

As Grant prepared to ride off he gave one order to Wallace and McClernand, "Gentlemen, the position on the right must be retaken." With that he rode north to the headquarters of C.F. Smith. Smith's was the only division which had not been engaged during the morning and Grant could see that for Floyd to have attacked McClernand in such force the Confederate lines in front of Smith must be very lightly manned. Grant ordered an assault.

With pressure expected from the other two divisions Smith commanded the proverbial Napoleonic Corps le decision. Although the trenches were lightly held, the position was strong and for a while the raw volunteers of 2nd Division wavered. But every time the troops looked like breaking old General Smith was there, finally riding in front of his

men with his cap on his sword. With a shout of "No flinching now my lads" he pushed through the fallen trees which formed rudimentary abatis and was followed by his increasingly awe struck subordinates.

When it became clear that the northerners were not going to break, the defenders gave up their trenches and ran. The remainder of Buckner's works were cleared and Smith settled down to await the return of the main Confederate force from the right flank.

In the centre of the line Lew Wallace prepared to launch an assault to recover the positions lost by him earlier in the day. The attack was led by M.L. Smith, a laconic fellow who, when his cigar was shot out of his mouth, paused to light another one before resuming the advance. Here as on the left the Confederates retreated when it became clear that the Union men were pressing home their attack. The southerners were chased right back into their trenches, a considerable distance.

When night fell the position of the two armies was as follows. On the Union right the lines occupied prior to the morning's attack had been reoccupied and the Confederates similarly occupied the trench lines from which their attack had jumped off.

On the left Smith had captured a considerable length of the Confederate works and had repelled a late counter-attack by Buckner. His position overlooked a good portion of the fort and placed him in an excellent situation from which to launch further attacks on the 16th. Grant had not only recovered from the initial surprise of his army but he had swung the situation around to his advantage.

Inside Fort Donelson the mood amongst the Confederate commanders was low. Nathan Bedford Forrest was ordered to make a reconnaissance in order to ascertain whether the Nashville road was still clear. It was not.

In fact the Union lines extended further and appeared stronger than they had that morning. Upon hearing this Buckner was the first to speak. He first

established whether Johnston had succeeded in withdrawing his forward elements under Hardee from the vicinity of Bowling Green. When told that he had Buckner replied that since a continuation of the fight would result in the Confederate army being chewed up by the artillery now occupying his old positions the only correct course of action was to surrender.

Both Floyd and Pillow agreed with Buckner's summing up of their situation. The initiative now passed to Floyd who, as commander, was expected to take the responsibility for the surrender. Floyd, however, had other ideas. He was already a wanted man in Washington. As secretary of War he had been accused of shifting Federal arms to southern arsenals on the eve of the rebellion. He had no wish to face up to those charges. Floyd therefore turned his command over to Pillow.

Pillow likewise did not want to surrender. He had sworn an oath never to surrender and invoking it he turned the command over to Buckner. And so it came down to Buckner, the only real soldier of the three Brigadiers who commanded Fort Donelson. He calmly began to compose a note to Grant in which he made plain his intentions to surrender the fort.

As this was begun Forrest who had been present since his reconnaissance angrily refused to be made to surrender. Buckner gave him permission to cut his way out providing he did it quickly, before negotiations were entered into.

Floyd and Pillow loaded what men they could, about 3000, onto the few boats available and headed down the Cumberland River. Forrest was more dramatic. In order to make his way around the right of the Union line he was forced to swim his horses over the wide section near the mouth of a creek near Dover.

Buckner wrote his letter which was sent into the Federal lines. In the early hours of February 16 Grant was woken by C.F. Smith who delivered the note which read as follows.



*Sir: In consideration of all the circumstances governing the present situation of affairs at this station, I propose to the Commanding Officer of the Federal forces the appointment of commissioners to agree upon terms of capitulation of the forces and fort under my command, and in that view suggest an armistice until 12 o'clock today.*

Grant read the letter and then turned his attention back to Smith. "Well, what do you think of it?" he asked. In Smith's reply was the kernel of a legend, "I think, no terms with the traitors, by God!" Without any further discussion Grant drafted his reply.

*Sir: Yours of this date, proposing armistice and appointment of Commissioners to settle terms of capitulation, is just received. No terms except an unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted. I propose to move immediately upon your works.* Smith was delighted, "By God, it couldn't be better."

Buckner was an old friend of Grant's and the Union commander owed him money. If this had been expected to gain better terms Buckner was sorely disappointed. He had just lost around 4000 men, not including the battle losses of the previous day and he knew that his command was in no fit state to repel a Union assault on the following morning. Begrudgingly Buckner acceded to Grant's demands. A later attempt by Grant to repay his old debt was refused.

The mood among the Union soldiers was jubilant, indeed it was so much so that Bushrod Johnson walked casually out through the Union lines. While Grant may have been sorry to let Johnson escape he made it clear that he was not upset to see Pillow go. "If I had captured him" he said, "I would have turned him loose. I would rather have him in command of you fellows than as a prisoner."

Grant became an overnight hero. This was the victory, people said, which rubbed out the shame of Bull Run. All through the Northern papers there were pictures of Grant as well as descriptions of his appearance and character. The note which Grant had written to

Buckner was printed far and wide and from it Grant acquired a new nickname. Because of his initials he became Unconditional Surrender Grant. It seemed to suit the determined little man.

Although some people have tried to take credit away from Grant and to focus on his absence or the failure of the gunboats these criticisms do not really stand up to close scrutiny. As the commander of a combined arms force Grant was required to liaise with the navy and he can be forgiven for thinking it unlikely that the Confederates would bring on a battle during his brief absence. The most important factor is that once Grant was on the battlefield what had been a lost battle suddenly became a glorious victory. He saw immediately what was required and upon carrying it out was successful. As always throughout his career Grant considered, to paraphrase another U.S. president, not what the enemy could do to him but rather what he could do to the enemy.

As a result of Grant's victory Kentucky became wholly Union and Tennessee was laid open to invasion. The subsequent capture of most of the latter state deprived the Confederacy of a valuable recruiting ground as well as their second largest gun foundry. It has been estimated that the fall of Fort Donelson cost the south the services of 100,000 men.

### CREATING THE SCENARIOS

For some obscure reason the first map I ever saw of Fort Donelson was upside down. That is to say that instead of subscribing to the arbitrary custom of north being at the top of the map the cartographers had placed it at the bottom. Perhaps they were southern sympathisers? Anyway by the time I realised what they had done I had constructed my map with north at the bottom. Being an Australian and therefore not entirely conversant with the geography of the good old U.S.A. I did not discover that my map was upside down until I came to write the article and

really hit the books. I do not intend to change the map. It is entirely accurate except that you have to remember that south is up. If this disturbs you then I apologise. If it really disturbs you then I can recommend a friend of mine who is a good shrink.

If this is the first time you have tried to transfer a magazine scenario onto a save-game disk (or hard disk), we recommend you follow these directions. The letters in parentheses after each heading refer to the corresponding section in the Decisive Battles manual.

There is some additional information for IBM users at the end of this section. Be sure to read it, especially if you have an EGA/VGA card and want to take advantage of our "full map" graphics.

Macintosh users should note there are some changes to the numbering system in their design manual and that access to the various design routines is obtained through conventional, pull-down Mac menus.

**Preparing the Disk [3].** Boot up the Master Disk and select <CREATE> from Menu H. Select <SCENARIO> from Menu B. <LOAD> any historical scenario. You have been processed through to Menu J. Select the <DISK> line from that menu.

If you have one disk drive, remove the Master Disk and replace it with a blank disk. If you have two drives, remove the Scenario Disk from the second drive and replace it with a blank disk.

Select <FORMAT> from the on-screen menu. Once this is done, select <SAVE> from the menu and store any of the historical scenarios in any unused save-game location. This procedure prepares the template on which we will build the *Kernstown* scenario.

Hard disk users should note that all they need is enough room on their hard disk to hold the new scenarios. Macintosh users should note that they do not need to use an existing scenario as the template. They can select *New* from the File Menu.

The WarPlan™ menus are displayed on the back of the game menus card.



Refer to this when necessary. Macintosh users should check their WarPlan™ manual for the location of the different design routines.

**Title [5c].** There are three lines of text for the title of the scenario:

Monocacy

Defending the Capital

July 9th 1864

Go back to Menu J and re-save the game in the same location.

**Map Size [5a(i)].** The top left sector is 0. The bottom right sector is 8. Macintosh dimensions are 27 x 27.

**Define Terrain [5a(ii)].** The accompanying Terrain Effects Chart lists the details of the active terrain types for this scenario. Select (or paint) the icons of your choice to represent the ten terrain types.

**Create Map [5a(iii)].** Select the <CLEAR> line from Menu J. Clear the map and the data. Use the accompanying map to build up the screen map. Do not forget to assign control to each hex. Save the game again. How often you save really depends on how lucky you feel. After several major disasters, I choose to save after each section is completed.

**Limits [5b(i)].** Before you can enter the military units for each side, you must set the force limits. The force limits are as follows; corps (2), divisions (5), brigades (17). Apple II and C64 users must also set the artillery weapon limit to 11.

**Weapons [5b(ii)].** Consult the Small Arms and Artillery Tables and enter the data as shown.

**Forces [5b(iii)].** Edit the North (Union) Army HQ and the South (Rebel) Army HQ as shown in the data tables.

The objectives assigned to the Army HQs will not appear on the screen until after the objective data base has been entered.

Neither side has any Corps in this scenario.

The North has 3 divisions. The South has 4 divisions. Consult the Divisions Table and enter the data as shown.

The North has 17 brigades. The South has 16 brigades. Consult the Brigades Tables and enter the data as shown.

**Objectives [5b(iv)].** There are 9 objectives. Consult the Objectives Table and enter the data as shown.

**Scenario Setup [5d(i)].** Enter the following data. Date (9), Month (7), Year (64), Century (18), North Maximum Hex Movement is (7,0,11,0,10), South Maximum Hex Movement is (8,0,12,0,12), neither side is encamped. The entrenchment values (introduced only in Volume II) are 0 for both sides. VP awards are 15 per leader, 3 per 100 men (North), and 25 per leader, 5 per 100 men (South). IBM and Macintosh users should note the combat value for this scenario is 3 for the North and 5 for the South.

**Scenario Details [5d(ii)].** This is a one day scenario. Enter the following data for Day 1. The weather is Clear (0), the North is Defensive (0) and the South is Offensive (1), 9am to 6pm are day (3), move (1) turns and 7pm is a day (3), End (2) turn. Finally, save again and the scenario is ready to play.

#### NOTES FOR IBM USERS

IBM users with CGA, MCGA, Tandy or Hercules graphics can create the scenario using the advice given above. There is a minor change in the weapons data base. You do not have to set limits for weapons. There is space for 31 weapons of each type.

IBM users with EGA or VGA cards must first create the game map with the "full-map" graphics disabled. To do this, run the program as DB2 f (or DB3 f or DB1 f) which will by-pass the "full-map" graphics. Select a scenario as a template as explained above and save it in a save-game location. Build up the map in the usual way and save when finished. The rest of the data for the scenario may be entered with the "full-map" graphics either disabled or enabled. There is a full explanation of "Full Map" graphics in Issue 14.

Re-boot the program (this time with the "full-map" graphics enabled) and

use the "full-map" WarPaint™ tool to build up the map. In other words, the "full-map" graphics are only graphic images and do not affect the play of the game.

#### A NOTE ON .LBM FILES

The .lbm files contain the graphic images. DPaint2™ from Electronic Arts can be used to manipulate the file. Up to 250 hexes can be created but DPaint2™ must be used to change the size of the .lbm file. To do this, use the 'Page Size' function to alter the height of the file.

The Decisive Battles program reads the size of the .lbm file on loading and adjusts the WarPaint™ values automatically. If you don't want to worry about manipulating .lbm files, choose a scenario with a 250-hex .lbm file as the template to build the new scenario on.

When saving an .lbm file, a temporary file is created first. When the temporary file is successfully saved the original is deleted and the temporary file renamed. This means there must be enough space on the current disk to hold the temporary file.

Macintosh users will find no such complications when it comes to creating scenarios. Follow the directions given in the design section of any *Decisive Battles* game manual.

#### PLAYER'S NOTES

Both players will note that the scenario runs over two days, thus examining what might have happened had the Confederates not surrendered on the night of February 15. A bit of minor fiddling in Warplan™ is all that will be required to alter the scenario to a one day battle. Both versions of the battle were examined and the two day scenario appeared to be the most fun.

#### North

You have no control over the initial Union defence so don't worry. You will lose most of McClernand's division but once the Rebs have run out of puff you will be able to counterattack hard. Form a line and then slowly ad-



vance up the map killing Confederates. The Rebs will not surrender as they did in reality so try to take all the active objectives by the end of the game.

### South

The Union are surprised but they will not stay that way for long. Attack anything even remotely blue because once the effects of being surprised have passed it will depend on you as to whether the bluecats can be kept running. If the Union regain the initiative then you will have to hold on and try to eke out a points victory. ♦

## BREAKTHROUGH Continued from p. 3

available, particularly the shrapnel shell.

The first attempt at breaking the trench lines used what Johnson refers to as the "Infantry Assault model". Infantry was massed against one point of the enemy line in an attempt to overwhelm the defences. Given the primitive state of the early trench systems such assaults met with mixed success. At Neuve Chappelle the British broke through into open fields only to be met by German reserves. Subsequent assaults against stiffening German resistance proved disastrous.

As defensive systems became wider the difficulty of achieving a breakthrough increased. One trench line could be captured easily but attacks on subsequent trench lines almost invariably failed. The reasons for this were obvious.

When attacking the enemy front line artillery could be massed in support of the infantry and the attack had the benefit of the initial planning and co-ordination. After the capture of the first line of trenches all these benefits disappeared. Supplies or replacements

had to come on foot across No-Man's Land while the enemy could bring in reserves by truck or train.

With the failure of the "Infantry Assault model" an increasing emphasis came to be placed on firepower. Firepower had created the deadlock, surely it would prove powerful enough to break it.

Almost imperceptibly, the "Infantry Assault Model" evolved into the "Artillery Destruction Model" in which an area of enemy defences would be saturated with fire, leaving the infantry to occupy the now vacant ground. During 1915 and 1916 the words "Artillery conquers, Infantry occupies" became a catch cry.

While it seemed incomprehensible that anything could survive bombardments of the scale which now became common, this was the case. Once again the defence adjusted to cope with the new tactics. The front line now became an outpost line, only weakly held, while the main defences were pushed further and further back. Continuously held trench lines gave way to strongpoints and concrete bunkers gave protection to troops not actually manning the defences.

As with the previous model the "Artillery Destruction" was steadily increased in power until its failure was acknowledged. If a breakthrough was to be achieved then new techniques and/or new weapons would be necessary.

The "Infantry Assault" and "Artillery Destruction" Models came about in an attempt to break the trench deadlock and return to open warfare. At the same time as these ideas were being explored another model of warfare was being developed alongside these two.

The "Siegecraft Model" embraced, rather than trying to defeat the trenches. What had begun as temporary shelter from bombardment was developed, especially by the Germans, into elaborate systems of fixed defences. More than a little of the 18th Century teachings of Vauban went into the construction and the defeat of these structures.

At Messines in April 1917 a gigantic mine was detonated under German positions. Previously, at Vimy Ridge infantry saps had been constructed as jump-off points for the attack.

The "Siegecraft Model" gave results but of a limited kind. Despite its validity, and the broader applicability of individual siegecraft techniques, another tactical scheme would have to be developed to win the war.

Ultimately it was to be a return to combined arms warfare which ended the trench stalemate. It was, however, to be a combination of arms some of which had never before been seen on the battlefield.

Of many experimental weapons between 1914 and 1918, perhaps the most anticipated was the tank. From H.G. Wells to Winston Churchill the proponents of a "land battleship" were many and varied. Tanks were first used on September 15, 1916 in the Battle of the Somme and were rapidly improved over the next year.

The Battle of Cambrai (see Issue 18) saw the first large scale use of tanks along with silent registration of guns and ground attack aircraft. The effect was to punch a hole through the new Hindenburg Line. In the same battle the Germans counterattacked using unprecedented numbers of specially trained stormtroopers who eschewed traditional linear tactics and penetrated between positions.

Both approaches worked. The Allied system had more punch with their tanks while the German system (helped by facing weaker Allied defences) was more resilient, depending on a more plentiful resource, human lives. The common factors were huge but short surprise barrages, ground attack aircraft and a command control system unprecedented in the history of warfare.

Even given the improvements of the preceding four years the open warfare of 1918 was still not that of 1939. While it is all very well to have a highly mobile spearhead which can achieve a breakthrough, unless all the other fac-



ets of the military machine can keep pace with the spearhead then the depth of the breakthrough will be limited.

The German breakthroughs of 1918 were halted as much because of the immobility of the artillery and the supply services as they were by the Allies. Similarly, during October and November 1918 the British were advancing almost as fast as it was possible for a dominantly horse drawn army to move. The lightning advances of five miles a day put unbelievable strain on all branches of the service except the infantry. Almost no tanks were available, most having broken down, artillery was left behind and the supply services were in chaos. It would take another 20 years of technological development to create what the Royal Tank Corps dreamed of in 1918, a completely mechanised army."

*Breakthrough! Tactics, Technology and the Search for Victory on the Western Front in World War I* was written by Hubert C. Johnson in 1994 and was published by Presidio Press of Novato California. ♦

## LETTERS

### Continued from p. 4

My main request was for an 'Alamein' accounting when rating generals which was totally ignored in your comments. Sure, the Americans advanced 30km vs 10km in Normandy by July 25 until their adoption of a narrow front offensive (Cobra), but provide an accounting of the men, quality, tanks, vehicles, artillery, and air power for the two armies, and their respective German opposition when judging achievements. Let me illustrate this type of accounting for the (Mortain) counter-attack you reported as a Patton feat of arms:

After being forewarned by ULTRA of a potential German counterattack, the Americans prepared by diverting three infantry divisions to back up the five

infantry divisions and two armoured combat commands in the area. On August 7 this force was attacked by four nominal, burnt out panzer divisions which actually had the strength of one. When the morning fog lifted by noon the Germans were subjected to savage air attacks, and their offensive collapsed.

The best thing I would say about Montgomery is that given the equipment deficiencies, and exhausted manpower resources of the British after the disasters of the first three years of the war, he was able to implement a style of fighting suited to his armies (like U.S. Grant) that enabled them to prevail for the remainder of the war. Remember, these armies did the actual fighting and pursuing regardless of what Montgomery might order them to do.

Patton was not without his virtue. Leading an army that had uncontested air superiority, fantastic material resources, and deep manpower reserves, he could afford to order 'attack' in all circumstances at little risk. Sometimes circumstances favoured this approach, other times they didn't, but Patton didn't have the talent to do anything else.

All the palaver about him being a great general has no historical basis. My original letter was intended to bring some reality to the Patton myth and was not really concerned with the reputation of Montgomery. But wherever you choose to put Patton in your hagiology, he should be shoulder to shoulder with his friend Monty.

Sincerely

Richard MacRae

Richmond

British Columbia

Canada

Ed. Thank you Richard for another thought provoking letter. I don't intend to launch a diatribe having done so last issue. I do however, wish to comment on a few of your points. Firstly we are far more anti-Montgomery here at SSG than we are pro Patton. When I

said that I thought Patton was "the best Allied Army commander of the war" I was as much suggesting a dearth of real talent among the western Allies as I was praising Patton himself. There were numerous competent Army commanders on both sides in WWII but most of those who stood out from the pack were German. I would rate the top ten German Army commanders as being better than the best of their western Allied counterparts (you may notice that I have avoided mention of Russian Army commanders because, in common with most military enthusiasts, I know less than I ought to about the personalities behind the Soviet defeat of Germany. There is no doubt that among the commanders of the six Guards Tank Armies there were men who, by the end of the war were the equal of any of their opponents.)

A point of some significance is that I can think of no Allied general in the European theatre who successfully commanded at Army level or above in both offensive and defensive campaigns. Some generals fought defensive battles as part of an overall offensive campaign but none of these had to cope with saving an army from a losing situation.

By the time the Allies had built up to the extent that they had gained the strategic initiative the successful generals like Auchinleck had been sacked along with the failures. The unbroken string of Allied offensives which began in late 1942 showcased a new group of generals, none of whom ever really had the opportunity to prove himself in a situation of adversity. It could be argued that the only really complete generals were therefore Russian or German.

The above thesis is, of course, harsh on those generals who performed well in every battle in which they fought, and some of the western Allied commanders in Europe may well have proved themselves to be truly great if they had

Continued on p.45



# PAVLOGRAD

## Manstein's Miracle

February 20th - March 13th, 1943

*A Scenario for the Battlefield Game System*

Scenario by Steve Ford, Text by Stephen Hand

*The encirclement of the Sixth Armee at Stalingrad spelt disaster for the Germans in their war against Russia. But the disaster at Stalingrad was nothing compared to what might have been. After Stalingrad a whole army group in the Caucasus, with a front stretching for hundreds of miles was connected to the main German forces by one slender avenue. The battle to hold this corridor open while Heeresgruppe A withdrew and the subsequent German counterattack at Kharkov saved the southern wing of the German Army. The eventual German success was the result of one of the finest pieces of generalship in the whole war, commonly referred to as Manstein's Miracle.*

On November 19, 1942 Soviet forces under Marshal Georgi Zhukov attacked the Romanian armies on either flank of Sixth Armee at Stalingrad. The Romanians collapsed and by November 21 a pocket had been formed. That same day Generalfeldmarschal Erich von Manstein was informed that he was to take over command of the newly formed Heeresgruppe Don between Heeresgruppe A in the Caucasus and Heeresgruppe B north of Stalingrad. The new army group was to consist of Fourth Panzer Armee, Sixth Armee and Third Romanian Army. Of these forces one army had been shattered and another was trapped at Stalingrad. The latter, Sixth Armee, had been ordered by Hitler to hold its ground and was forbidden to attempt a breakout. Outside the pocket Manstein had four weak Romanian divisions and 16th Motorised Division which was guarding the eastern flank of Heeresgruppe A.

The dilemma that von Manstein faced was that Sixth Armee was currently

tying down the bulk of the Soviet forces on the Don front. An abortive breakout attempt which resulted in the destruction of Sixth Armee would free up sufficient Russians to capture Rostov and cut off Heeresgruppe A in the Caucasus. However, if Sixth Armee made no attempt to break out it would eventually be destroyed anyway. This would also release the Russians to capture Rostov. Finally, even if Sixth Armee remained in place, it was probable that the Soviets had enough manpower to maintain the siege of Stalingrad while simultaneously slicing through to the Black Sea.

Manstein decided that the relief of Stalingrad would have to wait until the position of Heeresgruppe Don had been stabilised and a proper relief attempt could be mounted. Goering promised that at least a minimum amount of supplies could be airlifted into the Stalingrad Pocket. Like so many of the Luftwaffe chief's promises this one was to be only partially fulfilled. On No-

vember 26 Manstein reached Heeresgruppe Don headquarters at Novochoerkask and he took over command the following day.

The Soviets were advancing slowly towards the Black Sea, evidently hampered by lack of supplies reaching the forward elements. The Germans managed to scratch together a number of



### *The Victor*

*After the Capture of Kharkov this Officer from 1SS Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler was able to relax*





### ***The Master Strategist***

*Feldmarschall Erich von Manstein is pictured here with General Breith during Operation Citadel. His inspired command of the German southern wing in 1942-3 nearly made up for Hitler's incompetence*

emergency units but could not offer any meaningful resistance until reinforcements arrived.

Reinforcements were being rushed to the area, Fourth Panzer Armee was to receive a panzer corps of two divisions from Heeresgruppe A as well as a Luftwaffe field division. These were to be assembled in the region of Kotelnikovo, south of Stalingrad. A new formation, Armee Abteilung (detachment) Hollidt was to contain three infantry, one mountain, two Luftwaffe and two panzer divisions. It was assigned to cover the direct approaches to Rostov and husband it's mobile divisions in preparation for a relief attempt.

The reinforcements were expected to be available for operations in the first week of December.

The key to the success of the relief operation was to have fresh units which could be thrown into a simultaneous attack from two directions. In practice the fresh infantry divisions earmarked for Armee Abteilung Hollidt's relief attempt had to be committed to defensive fighting on the Chir River in order to prevent the Romanians from collapsing. Of the other formations promised to Manstein only three panzer divisions and an infantry division materialised. Armee Abteilung Hollidt was in no condition to attack and thus it

---

was decided that the relief effort could only be launched from the south by Fourth Panzer Armee.

The southern attack was thought by von Manstein to hold more promise, not having to cross the Don River. The Russians were evidently not expecting an attack from this quarter as Fourth Panzer Armee was opposed by only five divisions.

The delays in the arrival of reinforcements were interminable and the Russians could not be expected to remain quiet on the Chir River front forever. On December 4th strong attacks were launched which threatened to break through the thin line. 11th Panzer Division had to be committed in a series of local counterattacks in order to stabilise the position of Armee Abteilung Hollidt.

The Soviets also attacked 4th Panzer Armee on the east bank of the Don. These attacks were, however, reasonably light and were defeated in detail.

Manstein was concerned at the weakness of his relief force and requested a limited withdrawal by Heeresgruppe A in order to free up mobile divisions for Fourth Panzer Armee. This was refused by Hitler. Another possibility was that 17th Panzer Division, originally destined for the Chir River could be diverted to the relief effort. Again Hitler stepped in, retaining the division in reserve behind Heeresgruppe Don. Even 16th Motorised Division was retained as a flank guard for Heeresgruppe A rather than being replaced by a division from the Caucasus. It seemed that the greatest ally of the Soviet army was Hitler himself.

On December 12 Fourth Panzer Armee under Generaloberst Hoth began the attack to break through to Sixth Armee. With it's flanks protected by the remnants of Fourth Romanian Army 57th PanzerKorps advanced rapidly before being subjected to a series of Russian counterattacks.

All these attacks were beaten off but the forward progress of the relief force ceased. 17th Panzer Division was released from reserve on December 17



and began to move up to the front south of Stalingrad.

Meanwhile, the battle on the Chir River was reaching a climax. The Soviets successfully eliminated the Don bridgehead at Nizhne Chirskaya before launching probing attacks at the left wing of the Army Group which was still holding positions on the Don. This area was being held by the remnants of Third Romanian Army and so was less than dependable.

Adjacent to the Romanians was the Italian Eighth Army, forming the right wing of Heeresgruppe B. The Italians were considered by most Germans to be of even more dubious quality than the Romanians. Certainly by this stage of the war none of Germany's allies could be trusted to hold a line against a determined Soviet assault.

German fears proved well founded as the Italians collapsed at the first push. By contrast the Romanians fought well, at least for a while. When their left flank was uncovered by the retreat of the Italians, they too broke.

As the German front withdrew von Manstein urgently contacted Hitler to plead for the breakout of Sixth Armee. Once again Hitler refused the request, although the gap between the German front and the Stalingrad Pocket was widening.

Fourth Panzer Armee was making no progress so the only hope for a link up lay with Sixth Armee attempting a breakout. Attempts to convince von Paulus of the need to break out fell on deaf ears. Paulus was beginning a long slide into the depths of despair and was becoming increasingly malleable. His strong-willed chief-of-staff, Generalmajor Schmidt made the now-famous statement that Sixth Armee "will still be in position at Easter".

The commitment of 17th Panzer Division to the relief operation had immediate results. The Aksai River was crossed and 57th Panzerkorps penetrated to within 30 miles of the southern Soviet siege lines. A supply train was assembled in anticipation of the link up and an enormous number of

tractors were made available to replace the slaughtered horses which had previously dragged Sixth Armee's artillery. Even a temporary corridor through to the pocket would breath life into Paulus's trapped men.

As the Russians advanced on the west bank of the Don and the Germans did likewise on the east the operation to relieve Sixth Armee was reaching it's most critical stage. von Manstein resolved to take personal responsibility for the breakout in case Hitler again refused his permission.

Surprisingly the Führer allowed von Paulus to attack towards Fourth Panzer Armee but this was contingent on Sixth Armee holding Stalingrad. The impossibility of attacking in one sector

while maintaining positions in all others, of actually extending the length of the Stalingrad perimeter was ignored by Hitler. The German leader still clung to a fantasy that he could force a corridor through to Stalingrad and then hold the city until the spring offensive of 1943. It had worked at Demyansk the year before and Hitler was blissfully unaware of the massive improvements in the Soviet army since that time.


von Manstein now countermanded Hitler's order, replacing it with one of his own to abandon Stalingrad and concentrate all effort on achieving contact with Fourth Panzer Armee.

Inside the pocket von Paulus seemed paralysed. He claimed that he needed



*Tiger I of the 2 SS 'Das Reich' Division  
Taken in February 1943 this photograph clearly shows the condition of the  
average Russian road*





### SOVIET WINTER OFFENSIVE December 1, 1942 - March 31, 1943

- |  |   |  |                          |                |   |
|--|---|--|--------------------------|----------------|---|
|  | Re-occupied by Soviets<br>Dec. 1 - 12, 1942             |  | Front Line Dec. 1, 1942  |                | Major Soviet Attack                       |
|  | Re-occupied by Soviets<br>Dec. 13, 1942 - Mar. 31, 1943 |  | Front Line Dec. 12, 1942 |                | Manstein's Counterattack                  |
|  | Held by Germans<br>Feb. 19, 1943                        |  | Front Line Feb. 19, 1943 | <b>3G</b>      | Soviet Army (G=Guard,<br>T=Tank, S=Shock) |
|  | Re-conquered by Germans<br>Feb. 20 - Mar. 31, 1943      |  | Front Line Mar. 31, 1943 | <b>HOLLIDT</b> | Axis Army<br>or Equivalent Formation      |
|  | Stalingrad Pocket, Sixth Armee<br>Until Feb. 2, 1943    |  |                          |                |   |

### Situation Map for the Pavlograd Scenario

six days in which to prepare a breakout attempt. When Manstein replied that this was far too long, Paulus made the excuse that his tanks only had fuel for 20 miles; the gap between the two armies was 30 miles. When the requisite fuel was ever likely to become available is a mystery.

It was vital if Sixth Armee were to be saved that it attempt to breakthrough to Hoth's panzers immediately. It

seemed that von Paulus was determined to find any excuse to avoid action. Anything was preferable to risking all on one attack, even the certainty of starvation and surrender!

While von Manstein was arguing with both superior and subordinate the situation on his left wing was deteriorating to a dangerous degree. Attempts by Armee Abteilung Hollidt to echelon back it's left wing were in vain as the

Russians broke through the Romanians on the far left of the formation. The Soviet spearhead under General Badanov made a clean breakthrough and on December 23 reached Tatsinskaya, a movement of 150 miles in five days. The Russians had learnt well from their opponents.

The significance of Tatsinskaya was it's airfield from which supplies were being flown into Stalingrad. It was also



a mere 80 miles from Tatsinskaya to Rostov. If Rostov fell then Heeresgruppe A, with just under a million men, would be cut off from the main German front. Stalingrad would pale by comparison.

The day before Tatsinskaya fell into Soviet hands von Manstein made the only possible decision to save Heeresgruppe Don. He shifted 11th Panzer Division from the Chir to his western flank and requested a replacement division from Hoth east of the Don.

Hoth immediately dispatched 6th Panzer, his strongest formation. The surrender of a panzer division could mean only one thing. Sixth Armee was doomed. Even the release of 16th Motorised Division from its lonely job on the east flank of Heeresgruppe A would not be sufficient to maintain Fourth Panzer Armee in its advanced positions.

Even at this late stage von Manstein did not write off Sixth Armee. He sent a message to Hitler stating that he expected to stabilise his front by New Year. Then, if a fresh Panzerkorps could be made available from 1st Panzer Armee in the Caucasus, another attempt could be made to reach von Paulus and his men.

Both Hitler and Heeresgruppe A claimed that such a transfer was not possible. Anyway, the SS Panzerkorps of three powerful divisions would be made available to von Manstein in mid-February. In the meantime, Manstein would have to make do with the formations he currently had.

At this point the field marshal accepted that Sixth Armee was lost. von Paulus could only serve one more function and that was to occupy as many Russians as possible for as long as possible. The priority now became to hold Rostov until Heeresgruppe A could be evacuated from the Caucasus. The difficulties faced by von Manstein in this task were immense. Firstly the Russian tanks at Tatsinskaya were 80 miles from Rostov compared to 375 miles for the southernmost units in the Caucasus.

Secondly, there was no formed resistance between Tatsinskaya and Rostov and thirdly, Hitler appeared unaware of the danger to his southern flank and proposed keeping Heeresgruppe A in place.

Manstein wanted nothing less than full operational mobility. He proposed to Hitler that they give up the gains of the previous summer, withdrawing Heeresgruppe A and concentrating its mobile divisions around Kharkov.

The Russians would then be allowed to advance against the German southern wing and, at the critical moment, the mobile reserve would breakthrough to the black sea and pocket the Soviet spearhead. Not surprisingly Hitler did not even consider such a bold plan.

As Fourth Panzer Armee began to give ground east of the Don the German defenders remaining on the lower Chir River found their right flank being uncovered as their left had been with the breakthrough of XXIV Tank Corps to Tatsinskaya. The decision was therefore made to retreat, keeping contact with the forces on both flanks.

Hoth's Army had, in the course of the relief attempt, been reduced to two panzer divisions, the attached Romanian divisions having disintegrated. With his two remaining formations Hoth had to guard against two possibilities.

If the Russians turned his right flank they would be in the rear of Heeresgruppe A while if they turned his left they would have a clear run to Rostov and have Fourth Panzer Armee in the bag as well.

Against Hoth were three Soviet armies, Second Guards, 51st and 28th. These forces launched constant attacks on Fourth Panzer's front and flanks. The release of 16th Motorised Division from its flank guard position on the steppes gave the Germans one division to face each Russian army, hardly good odds.


On the Armee Abteilung Hollidt front things were looking grim until both 6th and 11th Panzer Divisions were committed against Soviet held Tatsinskaya. On December 24 lead elements of 6th Panzer cut across the rear of Badanov's XXIV Tank Corps and three days later



*Soviet Assault Troops Cross the Don, purportedly during the Winter Offensive of 1942-3*




# PAVLOGRAD - Map





# Terrain Key







### *The Soviet Spearhead*

*Russian T-34s roll through Pavlograd on the eve of the German counterattack*

the Russians were in a pocket. General, later Marshal, Vatutin was in charge of the Soviet South-west Front. He saw the danger to Badanov but felt that he could break through the flimsy German screen. When these attempts were unsuccessful, the Germans turned their attention on XXIV Tank Corps. It was annihilated.

On the night of December 28 the remnants of the Russian Corps broke out, without a single tank. The Soviets had begun to copy German techniques but they were unable to handle their formations with the tactical finesse of the two German divisional commanders, Raus and Balck.

Advancing alongside, but somewhat slower than Badanov had been XXV Tank Corps whose commander lacked both the drive and the skill of his colleague. Fresh from their victory against one Russian Tank Corps the two veteran panzer divisions split the Soviet force in two before crushing each half in turn.

With the destruction of the Russian armoured spearhead the immediate threat to Rostov was over. This was, however, only one in a series of running battles to keep communications

with the Caucasus open. As Heeresgruppe B withdrew to the west and Heeresgruppe Don to the south-west, a gap opened up between the two

formations. Just as General Hollidt's force had been scratched together to patch up a hole in the line so Gruppe Fretter-Pico was organised in the area between the two army groups.

Initially formed around the 3rd Mountain Division, Fretter-Pico was assigned one infantry and two panzer divisions as well as a mixed bag of smaller formations. Despite being enormously outnumbered the army detachment managed to hold the Russians back.

As the position north of Rostov stabilised the situation to the east began to deteriorate. Fourth Panzer Armee was forced steadily back by the three Soviet armies opposed to it.

Without reinforcements Hoth would at best be forced back onto the Black Sea coast and at worst one of the Soviet attempts to outflank his tiny force would succeed and he would disappear into a Russian pocket. The addition of 5th SS Panzergrenadier Division kept the German hopes alive but as the days went by each division was worn down bit by bit.



### *On the Attack*

*A Panzer IV races through the snow as part of von Manstein's counterattack*



On December 29 Hitler finally agreed to reduce the frontage of Heeresgruppe A. The left wing, currently in the air, would be refused, bringing the southern army group into contact with Fourth Panzer Armee. While the orders had been issued it was expected to be some time before movement commenced. The troops in the Caucasus had settled down into static warfare and were loath to move from their comfortable winter positions.

While Heeresgruppe A slowly began to move, pressure on the front of Fourth Panzer Armee forced it away from the Don towards the south-west. The resulting gap was exploited by elements of 3rd Soviet Guards Tank Corps who penetrated across the Don to within 12 miles of Manstein's headquarters at Novocherkask.

The field marshal was urged to evacuate but instead he pointed out that there were several recently repaired tanks in the nearby workshop. These were hastily mobilised and formed the nucleus of a battle group which threw the Russians back over the Don. Another threat to Rostov and the lifeline into the Caucasus had been narrowly defeated.

Much is made of the strain on the German forces in southern Russia during the winter of 1942/3 and without a doubt every formation in Heeresgruppe Don was under enormous pressure. What is often overlooked, however, is that the Russians too had been continuously in combat since the opening of the 1942 summer offensive. Their casualties far exceeded those of the Germans and everyone, especially the tank formations were battle weary. Gaps were common in the wastes of the Ukraine and opportunities abounded.

The fact that Russian commanders were not more willing to disappear over the horizon in a full-scale advance is not surprising given the German use of ambush and counterattack. The Soviets were learning, and learning fast but they had not mastered the "drive like hell and forget about the flanks" style of offense used by the successful pan-



### *The Russian Mud*

*A Sturmgeschütz supports the advance of German infantry in the latter stages of the counterattack.*

zer leaders. And anyway, as the men of XXIV and XXV Tank Corps had discovered, impetuous advance was not as easy against veteran opponents as it had been for the Germans in the opening days of Barbarossa.

Yeremenko, commanding Southern Front was adamant that 2nd Guards Army must take Rostov but his subordinates found forward progress increasingly difficult. Furthermore the withdrawal of Heeresgruppe A's left wing was completed on January 14, 1943. The most remote German units were now only 190 miles from Rostov. It was still several times as far as the nearest Russian unit but if Hitler would only agree to evacuate the Caucasus the million men south of Rostov might still be saved.

By January 20 a new crisis had developed. Fourth Panzer Armee was forced to stand east of the railway from Rostov into the Caucasus. Any further rearward movement would result in the rail link being uncovered and Heeresgruppe A being isolated. Deprived of operational freedom Hoth risked being surrounded as four reasonably fresh Russian corps attacked towards Rostov. Simultaneously Armee Abteilung Hollidt was strongly attacked. Manstein decided that of the two threats, the one in the south was

more immediate. He began moving 7th and 11th Panzer Divisions into the Fourth Armee sector.


It was on this same day that Hitler was finally convinced to reduce the German presence in the Caucasus to one army. First Panzer Armee under von Kleist was to be withdrawn through Rostov while Seventeenth Armee was to retire into the Kuban Peninsula where it could be supplied from the Crimea. It was only half the answer that Heeresgruppe Don was looking for but at least something was happening.

January 23 saw von Manstein given responsibility for yet more of the front previously held by Heeresgruppe B. One extra panzer division, the 19th was made available to the field marshal and with this he had to cover the area north of the Donetz to Starobyelsk.

Inevitably this one formation was unable to cover the entire frontage and was forced to retire south to cover Manstein's left flank. Once again there was a gap to the west between the two army groups.

The 7th and 11th Panzer Divisions arrived in the south on January 22 just in time to throw back the Russian advance guards south of Rostov. At the same time 16th Motorised Division was switched from the right to the left flank






## HEADQUARTERS DATA

FORMATION	HQ	XXXX HQ	1/KORPS	2/KORPS	3/KORPS	4/KORPS
HQ I.D.	[8]	1Pz Armee	40 Pz Korps	30 Korps	7 Pz Div.	5SS PG
UNIT TYPE	[8]	Panzer	Panzer	Infantry	Panzer	SS PzGr
HQ ADMIN	0-7	7	7	7	7	6
LEADERSHIP	0-7	7	7	7	7	7
HQ SUPPLY	0-7	7	7	7	7	7
BRITTLE	0-1	0	0	0	0	0
MOVEMENT	0-31	16	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
ARRIVAL	0-99	4	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
LOCATION	(x,y)	30,25	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

## UNIT DATA

FORMATION	D/C	1/1	2/1	3/1	4/1	1/2	2/2	3/2	4/2	1/3	2/3	3/3	4/3	1/4	2/4	3/4	4/4	1/-	2/-	3/-	4/-
UNIT I.D.	[3]	3Kg	3/3	73	Wes	62	682	683	684	25	6Pg	7Pg	7SA	5/N	5/G	5/W	SSA	27P	Stu	150	AUF
LOCATION	(x,y)	19,26	20,26	20,27	22,27	26,21	27,19	30,19	32,18	25,26	26,25	27,26	27,27	23,27	26,27	24,27	25,27	29,20	21,27	31,21	22,24
CLASS	0-13	11	2	1	13	0	0	0	0	11	2	1	13	2	2	2	13	11	10	13	6
MODE	0-3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
EQUIPM'T	0-31	13	11	21	17	1	1	1	1	13	11	21	17	12	12	12	17	13	15	18	16
MOVEMENT	0-31	13	12	12	12	8	8	8	8	13	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	13	12	11	20
ARRIVAL	0-99	4	4	4	4	0	0	0	0	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	0	4	0	4
MAX STREN.	0-15	10	10	9	7	10	8	8	8	9	9	9	7	10	10	10	7	9	8	9	7
INIT. STREN.	0-15	10	10	9	7	10	8	8	8	9	9	9	7	10	10	10	7	9	8	9	7
RATING	0-15	10	12	10	12	10	10	10	10	10	11	10	12	12	12	12	12	10	9	15	9
RANGE	0-15	1	1	0	5	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	5	1	1	1	5	1	1	8	0
FATIGUE	0-7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
EXPERIENCE	0-7	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	7	7	7	7	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
ATTACHM'T	0-4	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	2	1	2	3






## HEADQUARTERS DATA

FORMATION	HQ	XXX HQ	1/DIV	2/DIV	3/DIV	4/DIV
HQ I.D.	[8]	SS Pz	1SS	2SS	3SS	Gp Raus
UNIT TYPE	[8]	SS Pz	SS Pz	SS Pz	SS Pz	Kampf Gr
HQ ADMIN	0-7	7	7	7	7	6
LEADERSHIP	0-7	7	7	7	7	6
HQ SUPPLY	0-7	7	7	7	7	7
BRITTLE	0-1	0	0	0	0	0
MOVEMENT	0-31	16	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
ARRIVAL	0-99	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
LOCATION	(x,y)	5,7	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

## UNIT DATA

FORMATION	III/XX	1/1	2/1	3/1	4/1	1/2	2/2	3/2	4/2	1/3	2/3	3/3	4/3	1/4	2/4	3/4	4/4	1/-	2/-	3/-	4/-
UNIT I.D.	[3]	1SS	1PG	2PG	SSW	2SS	2D	2DF	SSA	3SS	3TH	3TE	SSA	18	15	39	106	150	Stu	1GD	2GD
LOCATION	(x,y)	11,8	10,9	11,7	9,7	9,10	10,10	8,11	8,9	24,25	23,25	22,26	24,26	13,4	11,0	6,6	3,4	8,6	8,10	12,8	11,9
CLASS	0-13	11	2	2	13	11	2	2	13	11	2	2	13	0	0	0	0	13	10	2	2
MODE	0-3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
EQUIPM'T	0-31	14	12	12	17	14	12	12	17	14	12	12	17	1	1	1	1	18	15	11	11
MOVEMENT	0-31	14	12	12	12	14	12	12	12	14	12	12	12	8	8	8	8	12	12	12	12
ARRIVAL	0-99	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	17	17	17	17	0	0	37	37	0	0	0	0
MAX STREN.	0-15	10	10	10	8	10	10	10	8	10	10	10	8	12	12	12	12	10	9	9	9
INIT. STREN.	0-15	10	10	10	8	10	10	10	8	10	10	10	8	12	12	12	12	10	9	9	9
RATING	0-15	13	12	12	12	13	12	12	12	13	12	12	12	10	10	10	10	15	9	12	12
RANGE	0-15	1	1	1	5	1	0	1	5	1	1	1	5	1	0	0	0	8	1	1	1
FATIGUE	0-7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
EXPERIENCE	0-7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	6	6	6	6	6	6	7	7
ATTACHM'T	0-4	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1	2	1	2






## HEADQUARTERS DATA

FORMATION	HQ	XXX HQ	1/DIV	2/DIV	3/DIV	4/DIV
HQ I.D.	[8]	4 Pz Armee	11 Pz	17 Pz	6 Pz	333
UNIT TYPE	[8]	Panzer	Panzer	Panzer	Panzer	Infantry
HQ ADMIN	0-7	7	7	7	7	7
LEADERSHIP	0-7	7	7	7	7	6
HQ SUPPLY	0-7	7	7	7	7	7
BRITTLE	0-1	0	0	0	0	0
MOVEMENT	0-31	16	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
ARRIVAL	0-99	4	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
LOCATION	(x,y)	13,26	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

## UNIT DATA

FORMATION	III/XX	1/1	2/1	3/1	4/1	1/2	2/2	3/2	1/3	2/3	3/3	4/3	1/4	2/4	3/4	4/4	1/-	2/-	3/-
UNIT I.D.	[3]	15P	110	111	11A	40G	63G	WEs	11P	4PG	114	6Sa	679	680	81	DA	AUF	150	Stu
LOCATION	(x,y)	5,19	6,19	3,19	5,20	10,26	12,26	11,27	13,25	15,26	14,27	14,27	8,14	8,16	9,18	5,17	12,27	13,27	5,21
CLASS	0-13	11	2	1	13	2	1	13	11	2	1	13	0	0	0	13	6	13	10
MODE	0-3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
EQUIPM'T	0-31	14	11	21	17	11	21	17	13	11	21	17	1	1	1	19	16	18	15
MOVEMENT	0-31	14	12	12	12	12	12	12	13	12	12	12	8	8	8	12	20	11	13
ARRIVAL	0-99	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	5	0	0	0	0	4	5	4
MAX STREN.	0-15	9	9	9	7	9	9	7	9	9	9	7	7	7	7	8	7	9	8
INIT. STREN.	0-15	9	9	9	7	9	9	7	9	9	9	7	7	7	7	8	7	9	8
RATING	0-15	13	11	10	12	11	10	12	10	11	10	12	9	9	9	12	9	15	10
RANGE	0-15	1	0	0	7	1	0	5	1	1	0	7	1	0	0	5	0	10	1
FATIGUE	0-7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
EXPERIENCE	0-7	7	7	7	6	7	7	6	7	7	7	7	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
ATTACHM'T	0-4	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	3	2	1






## HEADQUARTERS DATA

FORMATION	HQ	XXXX HQ	1/CORPS	2/CORPS	3/CORPS	4/CORPS
HQ I.D.	[8]	3rd Tank	15 Tk	1/3	3/3	1Gd Cav
UNIT TYPE	[8]	Tank	Tank	Infantry	Infantry	Gd Cav
HQ ADMIN	0-7	4	5	5	5	5
LEADERSHIP	0-7	4	5	4	4	5
HQ SUPPLY	0-7	7	7	7	7	7
BRITTLE	0-1	0	1	1	1	0
MOVEMENT	0-31	14	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
ARRIVAL	0-99	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
LOCATION	(x,y)	31,0	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

## UNIT DATA

FORMATION	D/C	1/1	2/1	3/1	4/1	1/2	2/2	3/2	4/2	1/3	2/3	3/3	4/3	1/4	2/4	3/4	4/4	1/-	2/-	3/-	4/-
UNIT I.D.	[3]	15T	15A	15B	SP	113	213	313	13a	62G	223	323	2/3	1Gc	2Gc	3Gc	GcA	Kat	Mec	Tk	Tk
LOCATION	(x,y)	12,0	13,1	14,4	14,1	14,6	16,4	18,5	19,3	23,0	22,0	23,1	24,0	28,0	28,1	28,2	29,0	15,0	13,0	14,0	14,2
CLASS	0-13	11	2	2	13	0	0	0	13	0	0	0	13	5	5	5	13	13	2	11	11
MODE	0-3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
EQUIPM'T	0-31	6	2	2	9	1	1	1	7	3	1	1	7	5	5	5	7	8	2	6	6
MOVEMENT	0-31	14	14	14	14	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	11	11	11	10	12	12	16	16
ARRIVAL	0-99	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MAX STREN.	0-15	9	12	12	8	12	12	12	8	13	12	12	8	10	10	10	8	8	6	6	6
INIT. STREN.	0-15	9	12	12	8	12	12	12	8	13	12	12	8	10	10	10	8	8	6	6	6
RATING	0-15	11	9	9	8	8	8	8	9	10	8	8	9	9	9	9	9	10	9	12	12
RANGE	0-15	1	0	0	2	0	0	0	3	1	0	0	3	0	0	0	3	3	1	1	1
FATIGUE	0-7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
EXPERIENCE	0-7	4	4	4	4	3	3	3	4	4	3	3	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	3	3
ATTACHM'T	0-4	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1	1	1	1






## HEADQUARTERS DATA

FORMATION	HQ	XXXX HQ	1/CORPS	2/CORPS	3/CORPS	4/CORPS
HQ I.D.	[8]	6 Army	1Gd Tk	12 Tank	Gd Inf	6Gd Cav
UNIT TYPE	[8]	Infantry	Gd Tank	Tank	Gd Infantry	Gd Cavalry
HQ ADMIN	0-7	4	5	4	5	5
LEADERSHIP	0-7	4	6	4	5	5
HQ SUPPLY	0-7	7	7	7	7	7
BRITTLE	0-1	1	0	0	0	0
MOVEMENT	0-31	14	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
ARRIVAL	0-99	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
LOCATION	(x,y)	31,2	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

## UNIT DATA

FORMATION	D/C	1/1	2/1	3/1	4/1	1/2	2/2	3/2	4/2	1/3	2/3	3/3	4/3	1/4	2/4	3/4	4/4	1/-	2/-	3/-	4/-
UNIT I.D.	[3]	GdT	1Gd	2Gd	GdA	12T	1Mc	2Mc	TkA	48G	57G	67G	Com	1Gc	2Gc	3Gc	GcA	Kat	Mch	Tk	Tk
LOCATION	(x,y)	9,14	9,15	10,14	11,14	10,18	10,17	11,17	13,16	27,18	11,10	25,20	31,17	11,15	9,11	12,9	13,11	12,14	9,16	10,15	11,18
CLASS	0-13	11	2	2	13	11	2	2	13	0	0	0	0	5	5	5	13	13	2	11	11
MODE	0-3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
EQUIPM'T	0-31	6	2	2	9	6	2	2	9	3	3	3	1	5	5	5	7	8	2	6	6
MOVEMENT	0-31	16	12	12	12	16	12	12	12	8	8	8	8	11	11	11	8	12	12	16	16
ARRIVAL	0-99	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MAX STREN.	0-15	10	12	12	8	10	12	12	8	13	13	13	12	10	10	10	8	8	6	6	6
INIT. STREN.	0-15	10	12	12	8	10	12	12	8	13	13	13	12	10	10	10	8	8	6	6	6
RATING	0-15	12	9	9	9	12	9	9	9	10	10	10	8	9	9	9	9	10	9	12	12
RANGE	0-15	1	0	0	3	1	0	0	3	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	3	3	1	1	1
FATIGUE	0-7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
EXPERIENCE	0-7	5	5	5	5	4	4	4	4	5	5	5	4	5	5	5	5	4	4	4	4
ATTACHM'T	0-4	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1	1	1	2





## HEADQUARTERS DATA

FORMATION	HQ	XXXX HQ	1/CORPS	2/CORPS	3/CORPS	4/CORPS
HQ I.D.	[8]	Front MG	4Gd Tk	10 Tank	18 Tank	2Gd Tank
UNIT TYPE	[8]	Mech	Gd Tank	Tank	Tank	Gd Tank
HQ ADMIN	0-7	4	5	4	4	5
LEADERSHIP	0-7	4	5	4	4	5
HQ SUPPLY	0-7	7	1	1	1	1
BRITTLE	0-1	1	0	0	0	0
MOVEMENT	0-31	14	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
ARRIVAL	0-99	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
LOCATION	(x,y)	32,8	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

## UNIT DATA

FORMATION	D/C	1/1	2/1	3/1	4/1	1/2	2/2	3/2	4/2	1/3	2/3	3/3	4/3	1/4	2/4	3/4	4/4	1/-	2/-	3/-	4/-
UNIT I.D.	[3]	4GT	1/4	2/4	4GA	10T	1/M	2/M	10A	18T	118	218	18A	2GT	1/2	2/2	2GA	Tkb	Com	Tkb	Ski
LOCATION	(x,y)	20,20	21,20	19,19	21,17	18,18	19,17	17,17	20,18	17,16	20,19	20,17	21,16	18,17	19,16	19,18	21,18	16,18	20,16	21,19	22,18
CLASS	0-13	11	2	2	13	11	2	2	13	11	2	2	13	11	2	2	13	11	0	11	0
MODE	0-3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
EQUIPM'T	0-31	6	2	2	8	6	2	2	9	6	2	2	9	6	2	2	8	6	1	6	10
MOVEMENT	0-31	16	12	12	12	16	12	12	12	16	12	12	12	16	12	12	12	16	8	16	11
ARRIVAL	0-99	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MAX STREN.	0-15	10	12	12	8	10	12	12	8	10	12	12	8	10	12	12	8	6	15	6	6
INIT. STREN.	0-15	10	12	12	8	10	12	12	8	10	12	12	8	10	12	12	8	6	15	6	6
RATING	0-15	12	9	9	10	12	9	9	9	12	9	9	9	12	9	9	10	12	8	12	9
RANGE	0-15	1	0	0	3	1	0	0	3	1	0	0	3	1	0	0	3	1	0	1	0
FATIGUE	0-7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
EXPERIENCE	0-7	5	5	5	5	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	4	4	4	6
ATTACHM'T	0-4	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1	1	2	1



# PAVLOGRAD - Briefing

AXIS			ALLIED		
SIDE [16] Germany			SIDE [16] Soviet Union		
CORPS [16] Army Group South			CORPS [16] South West Front		
COMMANDER [16] GFM Von Manstein			COMMANDER [16] Marshal Vatutin		
DAY	NIGHT	SUPPORT	DAY	NIGHT	
15	8	QUANTITY (0-99)	12	6	
2	1	RELIABILITY (0-3)	2	1	
14	10	RATING (0-15)	12	8	
AIR SUPERIORITY (0-7)					
STATUS =		<input type="text" value="3"/>	WEAK AXIS		
RELIABILITY =		<input type="text" value="3"/>	VARIABLE		

SCENARIO [16] Pavlograd	
BRIEFING [26] Manstein's Backhand Blow Feb 20th - March 13th 1943	
(0-3)	START = <input type="text" value="0"/>
(1-31)	DATE = <input type="text" value="20"/>
(1-12)	MONTH = <input type="text" value="2"/>
(0-99)	YEAR = <input type="text" value="43"/>
(0-20)	CENTURY = <input type="text" value="19"/>
(1-16)	LENGTH = <input type="text" value="19"/>
(0-3)	WEATHER = <input type="text" value="0"/>
(0-7)	FORECAST = <input type="text" value="6"/>
(0-7)	CLIMATE = <input type="text" value="5"/>
(0-31)	MECH MIN = <input type="text" value="12"/>
PRECIPITATION CLEARING ARCTIC	
BRITTLENESS	
(0-9)	AXIS = <input type="text" value="00"/> %
(0-9)	ALLIED = <input type="text" value="70"/> %
NIGHT CAPABLE	
(0-1)	AXIS = <input type="text" value="0"/>
(0-1)	ALLIED = <input type="text" value="0"/>

# PAVLOGRAD - Terrain Effects Chart

TERRAIN CODE (T0-T15)	TERRAIN NAME [10]	TERRAIN COSTS PER HEX		ATTACK EFFECTS		
		MECH (0-31)	NON-MECH (0-31)	ARM (0-7)	ART (0-7)	INF (0-7)
T0	Donets R.	-	-	-	-	-
T1	Snow	2	2	7	7	7
T2	Woods	4	2	4	2	5
T3	Kharkov	3	3	2	1	4
T4	-	-	-	-	-	-
T5	-	-	-	-	-	-
T6	-	-	-	-	-	-
T7	-	-	-	-	-	-
T8	-	-	-	-	-	-
T9	-	-	-	-	-	-
T10	-	-	-	-	-	-
T11	-	-	-	-	-	-
T12	-	-	-	-	-	-
T13	-	-	-	-	-	-
T14	-	-	-	-	-	-
T15	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	ROAD	1	2	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
-	FORT	N.A.	N.A.	3	3	3
-	CITY	N.A.	N.A.	3	3	3
-	BRIDGE	3	3	7	7	7
-	RIVER	N.A.	4	2	4	3



## PAVLOGRAD - Objectives and Miscellaneous Factors

I.D.	Name [11]	Map Loc [x,y]	Div. (0-3)	Def. (0-1)	Start (1-99)	End (1-99)	Pts/T (0-30)	Pts/E (0-255)
1(AX)	Kharkov	15,0	2	1	45	75	20	50
2(AX)	Krasnograd	9,11	2	0	1	65	1	10
3(AX)	Andreyevka	18,6	1	0	49	75	10	50
4(AX)	Novomoskovsk	7,15	2	0	5	16	10	20
5(AX)	Dnepropetrovsk	5,18	3	1	5	16	5	10
6(AX)	Pavlograd	12,17	2	0	5	20	10	25
7(AX)	Lozovaya	16,13	3	0	12	28	10	25
8(AX)	Slavyansk	25,15	1	0	9	28	5	25
9(AX)	Krasnoarmesk'	22,21	1	0	1	16	5	20
10(AX)	Zaporozhye	7,26	3	1	4	16	3	10
11(AX)	Izyum	24,11	1	0	21	66	10	50
12(AX)	Zmyev	16,4	3	1	33	75	10	100
1(AL)	Kharkov	15,0	1	1	45	75	10	50
2(AL)	Poltava	3,5	1	1	1	75	10	100
3(AL)	Krasnograd	9,8	1	1	1	75	5	50
4(AL)	Zmyev	16,4	1	1	33	75	5	50
5(AL)	Novomoskovsk	7,15	2	1	1	75	10	200
6(AL)	Dneprepetrovsk	5,18	2	1	1	75	20	200
7(AL)	Pavlograd	12,17	2	1	5	75	10	100
8(AL)	Izyum	24,11	2	1	21	75	5	50
9(AL)	Krasnoarmesk'	22,21	3	1	5	75	5	50
10(AL)	Zaporozhye	7,26	3	1	1	75	20	200
11(AL)	To Nikopol	1,27	2	1	5	75	20	255
12(AL)	Stalino	28,25	3	1	63	75	10	100

ADJACENT ENEMY HEX PENALTY (AXIS/ALLIED) (0-15)							
1st Hex =	<table border="1" style="display: inline-table; width: 30px; height: 20px; text-align: center;"><tr><td>0</td><td>2</td></tr></table>	0	2	4th Hex =	<table border="1" style="display: inline-table; width: 30px; height: 20px; text-align: center;"><tr><td>2</td><td>4</td></tr></table>	2	4
0	2						
2	4						
2nd Hex =	<table border="1" style="display: inline-table; width: 30px; height: 20px; text-align: center;"><tr><td>1</td><td>3</td></tr></table>	1	3	5th Hex =	<table border="1" style="display: inline-table; width: 30px; height: 20px; text-align: center;"><tr><td>2</td><td>4</td></tr></table>	2	4
1	3						
2	4						
3rd Hex =	<table border="1" style="display: inline-table; width: 30px; height: 20px; text-align: center;"><tr><td>1</td><td>3</td></tr></table>	1	3	6th Hex =	<table border="1" style="display: inline-table; width: 30px; height: 20px; text-align: center;"><tr><td>3</td><td>5</td></tr></table>	3	5
1	3						
3	5						

VICTORY POINTS PER STRENGTH POINT ELIM. (0-15)				
	MECH	NON MECH		
AXIS	<table border="1" style="display: inline-table; width: 30px; height: 20px; text-align: center;"><tr><td>2</td></tr></table>	2	<table border="1" style="display: inline-table; width: 30px; height: 20px; text-align: center;"><tr><td>2</td></tr></table>	2
2				
2				
ALLIED	<table border="1" style="display: inline-table; width: 30px; height: 20px; text-align: center;"><tr><td>1</td></tr></table>	1	<table border="1" style="display: inline-table; width: 30px; height: 20px; text-align: center;"><tr><td>1</td></tr></table>	1
1				
1				

MAP SIZE		
ACROSS (0-2)	<table border="1" style="display: inline-table; width: 30px; height: 20px; text-align: center;"><tr><td>2</td></tr></table>	2
2		
DOWN (0-3)	<table border="1" style="display: inline-table; width: 30px; height: 20px; text-align: center;"><tr><td>3</td></tr></table>	3
3		





### *Into the City*

*The apprehension can be seen on the faces of these men from 3SS 'Totenkopf' as they move into Kharkov*

of 57th Panzerkorps. The Soviet forces had broken through on that flank and the division found itself in their rear. 16th Motorised smashed the rearguard holding one of the Manych River crossings and then, cutting through Soviet columns reached the other bridge. The Russians, pressed frontally by the two panzer divisions had been able to retire into this bridgehead but after an attack by all three German divisions the Russians were forced to retire to the north bank.

Another crisis had been averted and unknown to the Germans this one was to give them some breathing space. Although Russian manpower seemed inexhaustible the constant attacks of the past weeks had taken their toll. After the German counterattack Second Guards Army was reduced to 29 tanks. The attempts to get around the northern wing of Fourth Panzer Armee had proved unsuccessful.

One Russian army might have been exhausted but others were being freed from the Caucasus. A fresh disaster loomed as heavy Russian attacks threatened the juncture between Fourth and First Panzer Armees. von Manstein demanded and got operational control

over the northernmost elements of Kleist's army. He was able to divert some of the retreating units to shore up the line. Once the front was stabilised the movement of 1st Panzer Armee became extremely rapid and it was decided that the bulk of this formation was to be transferred to the open left flank on the middle Donetz.

Throughout January 1943 Heeresgruppe Don had been kept alive not only through the improvisational skill of its commanders, from Manstein down, but through the continued resistance of Sixth Armee at Stalingrad. Not only was von Paulus tying down a number of Russians far in excess of his own total but he was sitting astride several important railroads and preventing the Soviets from receiving full supplies.

Had it not been for Sixth Armee's continued resistance, even a general of the calibre of von Manstein could not have saved the southern wing of the Wehrmacht in the winter of 1942/3. But Sixth Armee's resistance was coming to an end. On January 22 Gumrak airfield was recaptured in a Soviet attack. The airfield at Pitomnik had previously fallen to the Russians which

meant that no supplies were reaching the Stalingrad Pocket.

As units ran out of food and ammunition they either surrendered or were destroyed. The pocket was split, three main areas of resistance remaining in Stalingrad itself. Generalfeldmarschal von Paulus surrendered with his sub-pocket on January 31 and the remaining resistance ceased two days later. From this point on the Russians could expect both their supply and manpower situations to improve.

As First Panzer Armee filed through Rostov the threat to the German right flank lessened. Conversely their left flank became increasingly endangered as a race began between the Germans extending their line and the Russians attempting to outflank it to the west. On February 8 the last rear guard of Fourth Panzer Armee crossed the Don and the bridges were blown. First Panzer Armee was already across the river and heading west to the threatened flank.

With a clear gap open to the west von Manstein likened Heeresgruppe Don's position to a 'balcony' projecting into the Donetz Basin. The long axis of the German line was east-west, from Rostov, along the Don to the Donetz and from there west to Voroshilovgrad. Between Voroshilovgrad and Kharkov was a military vacuum. The Donetz had been crossed by Soviet forces in a number of places between these two cities.

It was Manstein's intention to withdraw Heeresgruppe Don from Rostov and occupy a shorter line from Voroshilovgrad south to Taganrog along the Mius River. Hitler predictably forbade such a movement. von Manstein replied by asking the Führer to prepare an airlift of supplies for Heeresgruppe Don once they became surrounded. It was a statement guaranteed to obtain a response. Sure enough on February 6 Hitler summoned von Manstein to his headquarters.

Two matters were discussed by Hitler and his field marshal. The first was the



situation in southern Russia. Manstein stressed the need to give up part of the Donetz Basin in order to free up a number of divisions. These units would be required to oppose the Soviet thrust to the Black Sea. Hitler argued for four hours with von Manstein demolishing every one of the Führer's arguments. Finally Hitler gave in. Heeresgruppe Don was to be allowed to withdraw.

The second matter which von Manstein raised with his commander-in-chief was the leadership situation on the eastern front. It was pointed out how Hitler's personal decisions had resulted in the loss of Sixth Armee and in a potential disaster on the southern portion of the front. Hitler was urged to consider appointing an independent chief-of-staff to direct operations in Russia. Not surprisingly this request was refused. Returning to the Ukraine Manstein issued the orders required to put hundreds of thousands of men in motion. Fourth Panzer Armee was to be shifted over to the left wing of the army group while Armee Abteilung Hollidt was to wheel backwards into positions along the Mius River.

While these movements were being made the Soviets were advancing in the north. Belgorod and Kursk fell on February 9, slightly offset by the formation of Armee Abteilung Lanz in the Kharkov region. First Panzer Armee occupied positions along the Middle Donetz and tried unsuccessfully to eliminate two powerful Russian bridgeheads. Simultaneously the Soviets attacked both flanks of the Army.

The movement around the German west flank could not be prevented but a cavalry corps which penetrated between First Panzer and Armee Abteilung Hollidt was surrounded and eliminated.

On Manstein's eastern flank Hollidt was pulling his formations back from the Rostov bulge to a shorter line along the Mius River. The movement was successful and the new positions were occupied on February 17. Interestingly this movement caused elation amongst the Soviet generals on the southern

flank. It was deemed inconceivable that the Germans would undertake a partial withdrawal and therefore the movement was assumed to be the start of a general retreat to the Dniepr. Vatutin of South-west Front believed this to be the case, as did Golikov of Voronezh Front.

This assumption created a feeling of overconfidence among the Russian Generals. They felt that at last the Germans had cracked and were in full flight. Now the battle became a pursuit rather than the constant hammering of a weaker enemy.

The need to surround the German southern wing became a race against time, a race between two armies with one objective, the Dniepr. To the Russians winning the race to the Dniepr meant victory. Presumably to the defeated and demoralised Germans it meant survival. This view of events in the Ukraine had a great influence on Soviet strategy over the next month and led to them taking some unacceptable risks which played right into von Manstein's hands.

The field marshal was still worried about his situation. On February 12 he

sent a communique to OKH detailing the situation being faced by Heeresgruppe Don. The ratio of forces on the southern wing was estimated at 1:8. This compared unfavourably with the ratio of 1:4 endured by both Heeresgruppe Mitte and Nord. More importantly the Russians were committing their main effort on the southern wing. Therefore an attempt should have been made by OKH to massively reinforce von Manstein.

In response to the concerns expressed by von Manstein the command structure on the eastern front was reorganised. Heeresgruppe B was dissolved with Second Armee going to Heeresgruppe Mitte and Armee Abteilung Lanz being subordinated to Heeresgruppe Don, now redesignated as Heeresgruppe Süd (Army Group South).

While the dissolution of the group to his north complicated von Manstein's situation at a critical point in the campaign it gave him command of the formation facing the main Soviet spearhead.

The cutting edge of Armee Abteilung Lanz were the 1st and 2nd SS Panzer



#### R & R

*By the end of the winter the Russians had liberated almost the entire area captured by the Germans in the previous summer, a fact obviously appreciated by these buxom peasant girls*



# Equipment

0	
1	Infantry
2	Mech Inf
3	Gds Inf
4	Cav
5	Gds Cav
6	T34/42
7	76mm
8	Katyusha
9	SP 76mm
10	Ski
11	Pz Gren
12	SS Pz Gren
13	Pz IIM
14	Pz IVG
15	Stug IIID
16	Sdkfz 234
17	Wespe 105
18	150mm
19	105mm
20	75mm Pak
21	Mot Inf

Divisions of Hausser's SS Panzerkorps. They were ordered to hold Kharkov at all costs. The fourth largest city in the Soviet Union had become, like Stalingrad, a matter of prestige and Hitler was prepared to sacrifice his two most powerful divisions to retain it.

Hausser had other ideas. By February 14 the city was almost completely cut off by encircling Soviet forces. This was reported to Lanz along with a request from Hausser to be allowed to withdraw. Lanz was not prepared to disobey a direct order from Hitler. Luckily for the Germans Hausser was. At 1300 hours on February 15 an order was issued from Hausser's headquarters ordering a breakout to the southwest.

By the end of the day the Russian lines had been broken and the SS Panzerkorps had been saved. Hitler was furious.

Despite Hitler's anger it soon became apparent that the surrender of Kharkov had allowed a stabilisation of the front. Gruppe Raus formed a solid line west of the city and the momentum of the Russian attacks was momentarily broken. Hausser had made a correct decision but the situation remained that the Führer had been disobeyed and someone would have to pay. The scapegoat was the luckless General Lanz who was dismissed in favour of General Kempf.

The fall of Kharkov again signalled the Soviet high command that the Germans were in full retreat. It was the only explanation for such a prestigious objective being surrendered by Hitler's elite. It was the signal for furious attacks along the German line.

In particular three armies of Voronezh Front were to burst through the German front southeast of Kharkov and attempt to capture the Dniepr crossings at Dnepropetrovsk and Zaporozhye. These were, north to south, the Third Tank Army, the Sixth Army and Popov's Front Mobile Group. Attacking southwest from the Donetz these three armies pierced the German defences and made steady progress.

A further eight armies comprising Southern and South West Fronts were to launch steady attacks on the Germans defending the Mius River. These were defeated all along the line, the few breakthroughs being crushed by the rapid counterattack of the mobile divisions.

The Mius line, however, had become the strongest sector along Heeresgruppe Süd's front. Manstein depended on Armee Abteilung Hollidt and the elements of 1st Panzer Armee to hold, just as he expected the Russians to be able to pierce his front to the northwest.

Hitler arrived at Zaporozhye on February 17 for a series of interviews with von Manstein and his subordinates.

The field marshal revealed to Hitler that far from the headlong retreat assumed by the Russians he was collecting his forces for an operation which would subsequently be referred to as Manstein's backhand blow. Divisions, particularly mobile divisions, were being pulled out of the Mius line and assembled on the flank of the Russian breakthrough. The SS Panzerkorps had been pulled out of the line and was awaiting the arrival of the 3rd SS Panzer Division from the west.

On February 18 the Russians took Pavlograd, cutting the vital rail link from Poltava. Heavy fighting continued on the Mius but all penetrations were quickly sealed off and the attacking units destroyed. Hitler was dismayed at the boldness of Manstein's plan and tried to change it. Finally a delay in the arrival of 3rd SS Panzer Division and the proximity of the Russians to Heeresgruppe Süd headquarters persuaded the Führer to leave the fighting to his field marshal. With the nearest Soviet unit six miles from Zaporozhye Hitler concluded his visit and allowed the soldiers to get on with their job.

The Russian units which were so close to von Manstein's headquarters were at Sinelnikovo and not a single German formation was between them and the Dniepr. There seemed no way for the nearest unit, the 15th Infantry Division to interpose itself between the Soviets and the river.

Seeing the danger the 15th's chief-of-staff decided upon an extremely risky manoeuvre. Sinelnikovo was a built around a railway station and the only way for the Germans to reach the town before morning was to send the men by train.

The first trainload was timed to arrive at midnight and the Russians awoke to find three companies of grenadiers storming through the town. Resistance collapsed and by dawn there was a solid line in front of the Soviet advance.

At the same time as German units were blocking the forward progress of the Russians 11th Panzer Division cut the



supply lines to Popov's Front Mobile Group. On February 20 Popov requested permission to retreat and secure his lines. Vatutin refused, it was clear that the enemy was himself retreating. What did it matter if, in the confusion of the fight one of the withdrawing German units had been lucky enough to cut through Popov's supply lines. The correct action was to push ahead and gain control of the Dnieper crossings. Only then would the German destruction be assured.

The Russians, with the exception of Popov, were unaware of their danger. It was time for von Manstein to give the order to launch the counterattack. The SS Panzerkorps north of the breakthrough was known to the Russians. Flank attacks from that quarter would not be a surprise.

What did surprise the Russians was the backhand blow. Every mobile division had been pulled out of the Mius River line and the steel core of two Panzer Armees was ready to smash into the unsuspecting men of the Soviet South-West Front.

On the right flank, nearest the Donetz elements of First Panzer Armee began cutting through the Front Mobile Group. The three divisions of XL Panzerkorps advanced rapidly, leaving pockets of Russian resistance in villages and other strongpoints.

The 333rd Infantry Division followed, mopping up. Further south the XLVIII Panzerkorps of Hoth's Fourth Panzer Armee struck into the flank of the Soviet Sixth Army which had thought itself covered on the left by Popov. Hoth was also given operational control of Hausser's SS Panzerkorps which attacked towards Pavlograd from the north-west.

On February 23 the ring closed behind the Russian spearhead. When the lead corps of Sixth Army sought permission to retreat it was refused. Soviet intelligence had reported the presence of the attacking German divisions but it persisted in interpreting them as the vanguard of a major retreat. Vatutin had been contacted that very day by Stalin

who demanded that better progress be made. Hence it was another full day before the Soviet South-West Front commander accepted that he had a problem. By then it was too late.

On February 28 XL Panzerkorps broke through to the Donetz and by the end of the day it was occupying defensive positions along the river. The last remnants of Popov's Front Mobile Group were swept into this barrier and annihilated. On Popov's right Sixth Army still existed thanks to spoiling attacks put in by Third Tank Army from the north. It didn't help. It took until March 2 but Sixth Army was finally destroyed.

Two Soviet Armies had been destroyed amounting to 100,000 casualties. Due to the preponderance of mobile divisions used by the Germans only 9000 prisoners were taken. Even where infantry was used few Russians were captured. In the Russian winter lines were rarely continuous, troops gravitating at night towards any possible shelter. This allowed numerous fugitives to escape across the frozen Donetz, without however, any of their heavy equipment.

von Manstein had won a great victory and stabilised the German front. He had regained the initiative at the moment when Stalin and his generals thought they had finally achieved their long-awaited destruction of the German southern flank. Not content with the destruction of South-West Front Manstein looked ahead to his next operation. He intended to move against Voronezh Front and recapture Kharkov.

Two weeks before, Russian generals had been praying that the Rasputitsa, the spring thaw would stay away long enough for them to complete the destruction of the German southern wing. By the end of February they were praying for mud. The gap in the Soviet line was 120 mile long. There was no way that the inflexible Russian war machine could hope to plug such a gap before the Germans took advantage of it. Only weather could stop the panzers and the weather remained cold.

Three Panzerkorps advanced in line abreast towards Kharkov. On the left was the SS Panzerkorps, in the centre was XLVIII Panzerkorps and on the right was the LVII Panzerkorps. The most significant early successes were achieved by Hausser and his SS Divisions. By March 3 two tank corps had been encircled and destroyed. Due south of Kharkov stiff resistance was put up by the 25th Guards Rifle Division which held up the entire XLVIII Panzerkorps for five days. Despite this heroic defence the city was outflanked by the SS Panzerkorps who on March 8 stood poised on to re-enter it.

By March 10 Kharkov was almost surrounded by German troops. The next day a regiment of 1st SS Panzer Division entered the city from the north east. The inevitable street fighting began.

When Hausser was ordered to transfer 2nd SS Panzer Division to the east flank of Kharkov and attack the stubborn guards in front of XLVIII Panzerkorps he saw an opportunity to achieve two objectives at once.

Rather than passing 'Das Reich' around the outside of the siege lines he chose to break into the southern part of the city from the west and cut through to link up with the panzers coming up from the south. On the verge of achieving this aim Hausser was ordered to withdraw the division and go the long way round. In consequence it was not until March 15 that the last resistance in Kharkov collapsed.

The Germans could count Kharkov as another major success. A huge salient in the German line had been reduced and Heeresgruppe Süd once again held a reasonably continuous line with its northern neighbour. Only one portion of that original salient remained, Kursk. Manstein wanted to combine with Generalfeldmarschal von Kluge of Heeresgruppe Mitte to snip off the Kursk salient and pocket another six Russian armies. von Kluge refused to co-operate and while the two field marshals argued the spring thaw came and the opportunity passed.



At the beginning of spring 1943 the German army was restored to the positions which they had occupied at the end of 1941. The entire gains of the summer campaign had been erased by Hitler's mistakes and only the brilliance of von Manstein had halted the pendulum in mid swing.

Since November 1942 the Germans had lost five armies on the eastern front. Admittedly four of those were allies, Romanians, Hungarians and Italians but in their absence the entire eastern front had to be held by Germans.

Armee Abteilung Hollidt was reconstituted at the end of March as Sixth Armee but this could not hide the fact that twenty divisions had died in the Stalingrad Pocket. The Russians had also lost five armies, the three lost to the backhand blow and the two, Third Tank and 69th Armies, lost in the fight for Kharkov.

The honours appear even at the end of March 1943 but the Soviets had blunted the German summer offensive for the second year in a row. Although the strategic initiative had been regained by the Germans the war had clearly entered a period of attrition.

The Soviets outnumbered and outproduced the Germans by a massive amount. The only reason why the war had not already been concluded in the Russian's favour was that the Germans still held a tremendous doctrinal advantage. The Russians, however, were improving. Soviet armour was handled with far greater skill in 1942 than it had been in the opening weeks of Barbarossa. The entire Russian war machine had matured which was an ominous sign for the Germans.

At the end of March 1943 von Manstein felt that the war in the east could not be won by Germany. He did feel, however, that by husbanding her resources and conducting operations such as his backhand blow against Soviet breakthroughs Germany could force the war into a stalemate.

Once the politicians on both sides realised the futility of continuing the struggle some sort of peace could be ham-

pered out. Militarily it was a plan of the highest order, one which gave Germany a chance of escaping from Russia intact. Such a plan, however, required complete operational flexibility and that was the one thing which Hitler refused to allow his generals.

A hundred days after Manstein's great victory at Kharkov the Wehrmacht was defeated at Kursk. An operation which had been desirable in March and possible in May had become sheer folly by July. von Manstein's brilliance saved the Wehrmacht in March 1943. By the end of July it was apparent that all he had achieved was to extend the suffering of his country for another two years.

## CREATING THE SCENARIOS

If this is the first time you have tried to transfer a magazine scenario onto a save-game disk, we recommend you follow these directions. The letters in parentheses after each heading refer to the corresponding section in any of the *Battlefront Game System* manuals.

Note that if you are building up the scenario on an IBM/Tandy version of the game, there are a couple of additional data entries to be made. These are noted where applicable. Furthermore, there is some additional information for IBM users at the end of this section. Be sure to read it, especially if you have an EGA/VGA card and want to take advantage of our "full map" graphics. Issue 14 of *Run 5* contains a detailed guide on the use of "full map" graphics on the IBM.

Macintosh users should follow the instructions in their game manual. In Issue 15 of *Run 5*, there is a detailed guide on WarPaint™ for Macintosh users.

IIGS and Amiga users should follow the instructions in their game manual. Most of the hints for Macintosh users are applicable to IIGS and Amiga users.

**Preparing the Disk [3].** Boot up the Master Disk and select <CREATE> from Menu H. Select <SCENARIO> from Menu B. <LOAD> any historical

scenario. You have been processed through to Menu J. Select the <DISK> line from that menu.

If you have one disk drive, remove the Master Disk and replace it with a blank disk. If you have two disk drives, remove the Scenario Disk from the second drive and replace it with a blank disk.

Select <FORMAT> from the on-screen menu. Once this is done, select <SAVE> from the menu and store the scenario in any unused save-game location. Select <CLEAR> from Menu J and erase both map and data. Save again in the same location. This procedure prepares the template on which we will build the Kremenchug scenario.

The WarPlan™ menus are displayed on the back of the game menus card. Refer to this when necessary.

If possible, we recommend you prepare this scenario with any of the *Halls of Montezuma*, *Panzer Battles*, *Rommel* or *MacArthur's War* master disks. If you are using the earlier *Battlefront* or *Battles in Normandy* master disks then a few variables will have to be omitted. These are noted in the text. Note that these restrictions apply only to Apple II and C-64 users.

**Corps Details [5.31].** Enter the data from the Briefing table.

**Scenario Details [5.32].** Enter the data from the Briefing table. Ignore the Century, Climate, Brittleness and Night Capable variables when using the BF/BIN master disks.

**Map Size [5.11].** Enter the data from the Map Size table.

**Define Terrain [5.12].** Enter the data from the Terrain Effects Chart. If you are using a HOM/ROM/MW/PZ master disk on the AII or C64 or any IBM, Mac or IIGS master disk, you can use WarPaint™ to create the customised terrain icons of your choice.

**Define Miscellaneous Factors [5.13].** Enter the relevant factors from the Miscellaneous Factors table and the appropriate part of the Terrain Effects Chart.

**Create Map [5.14].** Use the accompanying map to build up the screen map.



Do not forget to assign control to each hex as advised above.

Save the game again. How often you save really depends on how lucky you feel. After several major disasters, I choose to save after each section is completed.

**Equipment Roster [5.22].** Enter the data from the Equipment table.

**Troop Creation [5.21].** Enter the data from the OB charts into the appropriate locations.

**Objectives [5.23].** Enter the data from the Objectives table. Note there has been an additional variable introduced into the Objective data base in *Rommel* (IBM), *Halls of Montezuma* (Mac, IIGS, Amiga) and *Panzer Battles* (all versions). Objectives which have a senior HQ assigned to them may be designated as defensive objectives. Only the specified senior HQ will be affected by this condition and it operates only while the objective is under friendly control. A junior HQ from the specified senior HQ will be despatched to the objective and will defend it as long as the time reference applies.

Note that the movement mechanics in the IBM/Macintosh/IIGS/Amiga versions are more efficient than those in the AII/C64 versions and this may slightly alter play balance.

**Minor Combat Effects (IBM, Mac, IIGS, Amiga and Panzer Battles AII/C64) [5.33].** For the Pavlograd scenario, the Fort Enhancement values are 2 (Axis) and 2 (Allied). The City Enhancement values are 0 (Axis) and 0 (Allied). The General Enhancement values are 4 (Axis) and 5 (Allied). AII/C64 and Mac users may wish to experiment with play balance by altering the general enhancement values. Note that C64 users will need the *Panzer Battles* master disk or the complimentary *Battlefront System* master disk given out to C64 disk subscribers with Issue 14.

Finally, save again and the scenario is ready to play.

#### NOTES FOR IBM USERS

IBM users with CGA, MCGA, Tandy

or Hercules graphics, or using the first edition of *Halls of Montezuma*, can create the scenario using the advice given above.

IBM users with EGA or VGA cards and the *Rommel* (or subsequent) master disk have access to our "full-map" graphic routines. When creating the map or the unit icons, you must first disable the "full-map" graphics. To do this, run the program as rom f which will bypass the "full-map" graphics. Select a scenario as a template as explained above and save it in a save-game location. Build up the map in the usual way and save when finished. The rest of the data for the scenario may be entered with the "full-map" graphics either disabled or enabled.

Re-boot the program (this time with the "full-map" graphics enabled) and use the "full-map" *WarPaint*<sup>TM</sup> tool to build up the map. In other words, the "full-map" graphics are only graphic images and do not affect the play of the game.

For a detailed description of the procedure, read the article in Issue 14.

#### A NOTE ON .LBM FILES

The .lbm files contain the graphic images. *DPaint2*<sup>TM</sup> from Electronic Arts can be used to manipulate the file. Up to 250 hexes can be created but *DPaint2*<sup>TM</sup> must be used to change the size of the .lbm file. To do this, use the 'Page Size' function to alter the height of the file.

The *Battlefront System* program reads the size of the .lbm file on loading and adjusts the *WarPaint*<sup>TM</sup> values automatically. If you don't want to worry about manipulating .lbm files, choose a scenario with a 250-hex .lbm file as the template to build the new scenario on. When saving an .lbm file, a temporary file is created first. When the temporary file is successfully saved the original is deleted and the temporary file renamed. This means there must be enough space on the current disk to hold the temporary file.

#### A NOTE ON THE GAME SYSTEM

In contrast to most board games, movement allowances are expended after a unit has moved into a hex; i.e. provided at least 1 MP remains, a unit will always move one hex. Only the *Battlefront Game System* handles movement this way. Our other games all require a unit to have the full cost of moving into a hex available before they can move into it.

#### PLAYER'S NOTES

##### Soviet Union

Don't be deceived by your numerical superiority. The Germans are well placed to slice straight through your vulnerable supply lines. The location and glacial movement of your HQs make this a definite probability. Stalin refused Popov's pleas in this area. Don't make the same mistake. If you stabilise your flanks, your numbers can probably win in the end. The enemy can't beat you in a purely attritional fight. 3rd Tank Army in the north is a constant threat to the German left. Use it! Don't allow the fascists to cross the Dniepr in the centre of the map. This would be disastrous. The side with the last man standing will win.

##### Germany

The Russians are ripe for a well coordinated counterattack. You must pocket their spearhead early. Fortunately this shouldn't be too difficult. The real work is the reduction of the ensuing pocket. The fighting will tend to become confused so don't be surprised if you find that some of your units end up out of supply occasionally. This is a long scenario. You won't be able to hold objectives unless you kill the bulk of the Russian units. As usual you are outnumbered initially. Don't try anything until the mass of 4th Panzer Armee arrives on the field. Your forces are powerful but too many casualties could ruin your whole day. ♦



# Rabaul

## Another Step up the Solomons

November 1st -10th, 1943

*A Scenario for the Carriers at War Game System*

by Lt Commander Richard Mater, RAN

*October and November 1943 was a crucial time for both the Allies and the Japanese. The new carriers for the USN were just beginning to come on line and their newly formed air groups lacked skill and battle practice. Most of the Carriers were in the central Pacific taking part in what was termed the "Makee Learn" raid on Wake Island to give the Air Groups battle experience. Despite a series of tactical victories at sea in the Solomons the Japanese were being steadily forced back by relentless US pressure. Confidence in the USN was buoyed as increasingly it was proved they had the measure of the Japanese. Victories like the battle of Vella Gulf would become more and more frequent in the coming months.*

Admiral Koga, having inherited the CIC Combined Fleet mantle from Admiral Yamamoto still sought the 'Decisive Battle' fleet engagement which he believed was necessary to defeat the Americans. He interpreted the raids on Wake as the preliminary steps in an effort to recapture that island and steamed the entire Combined Fleet including the Third (Carrier) Fleet comprising *Shokaku*, *Zuikaku* and *Zuiho* from Truk to Eniwetok to await developments. He lingered there for a week before deciding the US Fleet was not coming out and returning to Truk.

*Shokaku*, *Zuikaku* and *Zuiho* remained at Truk. Koga was unwilling to risk them anywhere near the Solomons such was the strength of Allied air power at this time. He decided instead to activate a plan code named RO. The air groups were sent to Rabaul as reinforcements from where the combined Japanese air strength would fall upon the Allies in the Solomons. This plan was conceived early in October, well

before the American landings at Cape Torokina and Empress Augusta Bay and was designed to forestall or at least delay the relentless allied progress in the Solomons.

The Air Groups of the three Japanese Carriers comprised 82 Zeros, 45 Vals and 40 Kates plus six reconnaissance planes. Their pilots were among the most experienced and best trained available to the Imperial Japanese Navy at that time. Perhaps Koga deluded himself that the extravagant claims of the Pilots who took part in Yamamoto's similar plan "I" were real and that the Americans could be defeated using Rabaul as a static, unsinkable Carrier.

The reality was that the only possible outcome was to be further depletion of Naval Aircrews, further dilution of skill and a resulting need to rebuild at a time when the Carriers might better be employed at sea. As it turned out Rabaul was the last opportunity for the Japanese to meet a small section of the US Carrier fleet and defeat it in detail.

The Americans at the same time had decided to take another big "step" up the Solomons chain to Empress Augusta Bay on Bougainville. An invasion force (TG 31.6) screened by 11 destroyers of DesRon 45 bypassed major Japanese strong points on the Island, landed a Marine force and Construction Group and commenced building an Airstrip. The strategy of not confronting the Japanese directly was a good one as the Island of Bougainville was even more rugged than Guadalcanal and any Japanese counter to the landings from their strong points on Bougainville itself would involve traversing the most difficult terrain.

The landings would, however, involve considerable risk as the big Rabaul base was only some two hundred and thirty miles away. Vigorous air attacks could be expected and Japanese Naval intervention was also highly likely. The Japanese already had four airstrips in very close proximity to the proposed landing site. These were effectively neutralised by continuous attacks by Airsols fighters and bombers during October and early November. US Carriers *Saratoga* and *Princeton* also contributed to these operations during the early phase of the landings, operating from a position well clear of the Rabaul based aircraft.

Rear Admiral T. S. Wilkinson was in charge of the Amphibious Operation. For the initial landings he insisted that



ports Omori was instead, detected by Merrill's surface radar at a range of some 35,000 yards. Merrill led his ships in a complicated series of manoeuvres designed to thwart the expected Japanese torpedo attacks.

The Japanese force never had at any stage a clear idea of the forces opposing them. (Until 1949 Admiral Omori believed he had been opposed by seven heavy cruisers and twelve destroyers). The US cruisers kept the Japanese under a constant hail of radar directed shellfire.

The accompanying destroyers were given freedom of action and Captain Arleigh Burke with Destroyer Division 45 ( *Charles Ausburn, Dyson, Stanly and Claxton* ) launched a torpedo attack on the flank of the advancing Japanese columns just before the shell fire started however all torpedoes missed.

The initial salvos from Cruiser Division 12 were directed toward the left of three advancing lines of Japanese ships. *Sendai*, first in the line also containing the destroyers *Shigure, Samidare* and *Shiratsuyu* took the brunt of the shellfire. *Shiratsuyu* and *Samidare* collided while manoeuvring to avoid the salvos. They both retired and the badly damaged *Sendai* was sunk later in the action by gunfire and torpedoes.

The American gunfire switched to the other two Japanese columns and soon shells were falling all around *Myoko, Haguro* and the remaining Japanese destroyers. *Myoko* collided with the destroyer *Hatsukaze* but soon the two Japanese heavy cruisers were straddling the American Cruisers with accurate salvos. Only three hits however were scored by shellfire on the American ships, all on the *Denver*. US Destroyer *Foote* was unlucky enough to walk into a Long Lance torpedo and had her stern blown off. Despite repeated attacks by Japanese aircraft the following day she was towed to safety.

Merrill's force held the battlefield and Omori was forced to return to Rabaul, having lost the *Sendai* and *Hatsukaze* and sustained damage to *Haguro, Myoko, Shiratsuyu* and *Samidare*.

Having suffered this initial setback Koga dispatched a force of heavy cruisers from Truk (*Atago, Chikuma, Mogami, Takao, Suzuya, CL Noshiro* plus DD's *Suzunami, Hamakaze, Naganami* and *Tanikaze*) with orders to refuel at Rabaul then interdict the allies at Empress Augusta Bay.

The Allies, through excellent intelligence were aware of the Heavy Cruiser force and Halsey (after much agonising over the risks involved in sending a carrier force into the teeth of Rabaul) ordered TF 50.4 under Rear Admiral Sherman ( Carriers *Saratoga* and *Princeton*) to strike the Heavy Cruisers while they were in Rabaul Harbour. This forms the second action of the Historical Scenario.

When Sherman received the order he was refuelling near the Rennel Islands south of Guadalcanal. TF 50.4 proceeded at 27 knots to a launch point fifty seven miles southwest of Cape Torokina. The risks were even greater than Halsey had anticipated as he was unaware of the presence of the Japanese Carrier Air groups augmenting the Rabaul based aircraft.

The Americans were aided however by calm seas (which allowed the Destroyers of the Task Force to maintain 27 Knots) and heavy cloud which screened them from search planes.

The launch point was reached without detection. The strike was to be an all out effort with all aircraft from both carriers being used. Combat Air Patrol was provided for the carriers by ground based AIRSOLS (Air Solomons) fighters which rotated sorties over the carriers to provide continuous cover.

On the morning of November 5th 1943 the combined Air Groups of the *Saratoga* and *Princeton* struck Kurita's Heavy Cruisers in Rabaul Harbour. The weather which had covered the Americans during their approach was clear over Rabaul.

Although they had seventy fighters in the air the Japanese were unable to break up the American attacks. The Japanese fighters held back waiting for the US planes to break up into small

groups for the attack however the American pilots held their formation right until the last moment before diving or launching torpedoes. The Japanese could not follow into their own flank.

IJN *Maya* took a bomb right down the stack which exploded in the engine room causing damage which took five months to repair. *Takao* was hit by two bombs and holed on the waterline. *Mogami* was damaged yet again after finally completing repairs of damage sustained at Midway. *Atago, Agano, Noshiro, Fujinami* and *Wakatsuki* were all damaged.

Most of the damaged ships were forced to return to Truk. *Mogami* had to proceed on to Japan for repairs. The Japanese were unable to take revenge on the *Saratoga* and *Princeton* who beat a hasty retreat after recovering the strike. They were finally located (or so the Japanese thought) near dusk. That the Japanese Pilots still had the skill to wreak a terrible revenge was demonstrated when the searching group of Kates, which thought they had found the US Carriers put torpedoes instead through a LST and a PT Boat! They did not have luck to match their skill and TG 50.4 escaped.

Halsey was well pleased with TG 50.4's efforts. *Saratoga* and *Princeton* were held back until support from Rear Admiral Montgomery's TG 50.3 (*Essex, Bunker Hill* and *Independence*) arrived. On November 11th aircraft from both Task Forces attacked Rabaul again. The *Bunker Hill* was equipped with 33 SB2C Helldivers together with the usual Hellcat fighters and Avenger torpedo bombers. This attack on Rabaul was the first time Helldivers were used in combat. TG 50.4 planes arrived first followed by those of TG 50.3.

*Agano* and *Naganami* suffered Torpedo hits while destroyer *Suzunami* was sunk by dive bombers near the entrance to Rabaul harbour. The light cruiser *Yubari* and destroyers *Urakaze* and *Umikaze* suffered light damage from strafing.

The *Saratoga* and *Princeton* again escaped undetected but a lone Zero cir-



cluded Montgomery's Task Force at tremendous altitude. This enabled a large strike of 67 Zeros, 27 Vals and 14 Kates (followed a short time later by a flight of Betty's) to be accurately vectored to the *Essex*, *Bunker Hill* and *Independence*.

Most of the strike aircraft were from the Japanese Carrier Airgroups and despite vigorous opposition from the combat air patrol they delivered an attack with skill and determination. *Bunker Hill* seemed to be selected as the favourite target and was narrowly missed by five bombs. Another bomb was detonated in mid air while falling toward *Independence*. The US Carriers escaped largely unscathed.

This was to be the last time in the war that Japanese Carrier Air Groups were able to close a group of USN Carriers and deliver a co-ordinated attack. At the battle of the Philippine Sea most attacks were broken up well out with only isolated planes surviving to close the American ships.

It is interesting to speculate how serious damage to any of the US Carriers might have affected operations in the latter stages of the war. Perhaps there would have been more reluctance to expose them to Japanese land bases with a resultant prolonging of the Pacific campaign.

It is possible that employment of the *Zuikaku*, *Shokaku* and *Zuiho* on the flank of the US Carriers at either stage of the strikes on Rabaul might have lead to a serious reverse to the US Navy. Would *Saratoga* and *Princeton* have enjoyed the same immunity from attack had the weather been clearer?

The Empress Augusta Bay beach head was consolidated. Further landings were never seriously threatened and the United States Forces eventually occupied even the Green Islands, very close to Rabaul. The fortress of Rabaul was never directly assaulted but was bypassed and left to slowly wither.

The Scenarios.

There are a number of variant scenarios in RABAU. The historical scenario

has been shortened from a historically accurate but slow 11 days to a more playable and interesting six and a bit. All the action noted above takes place including both Rabaul strikes.

The heavy cruisers may not retire unless you damage them heavily enough. The Japanese heavy cruisers may not have enough endurance unless they call in at Rabaul for more fuel. The AIRSOLS cap over the carriers is simulated by having the Empress Augusta Bay strip operational with three fighter groups and good radar available. These fighters however cannot strike Japanese ships if the computer is Allied.

Other Scenarios explore what might have happened had the Japanese carriers been used. One of these uses more modern aircraft on the Japanese carriers. There is a large scale Fleet action variant in which both sides employ extra forces including the original *Hornet* which the Japanese towed away from Santa Cruz and have repaired!

In all variants the allies must resupply Empress Augusta Bay with 25 cargo points from the reinforcement convoy of destroyer transports. If this does not occur the best allied result will be a draw. Samuel Eliot Morison in Volume 6 of his "History of United States Naval Operation in World War II" states that all follow up supply was carried out by LSTs however the Belote brothers in "Titans of the Seas" contend that destroyer transports were used. I have used the latter as there is an existing graphic for them in the construction kit. ◆

## LETTERS Continued from p. 18

had the chance to fight under all conditions. Having said that, no independent adjudicator could seriously put Ike in the same class as Zhukov or Manstein.

Basically Patton stood out from his contemporaries because he had that thrust-

ing, advance at all costs, approach to armoured warfare that all the great German panzer generals had. He was the best exponent of blitzkrieg warfare the western Allies had. Montgomery, while not the worst general the British fielded was certainly not the equal of O'Connor or Auchinleck. Nor was he, I think, the equal of Omar Bradley, his American counterpart in North west Europe and therefore the man with whom he really ought to be compared.



Dear Mr Hand,

Received my copy of Run 5 and just thought I would follow up on some of it's content. First, good to see Monocacy scenario as I grew up in Rockville Md. not too far from the battlefield. In fact last winter we spent a few hours inspecting the part of the battlefield they are trying to preserve. By the way this brings me to another subject, Maryland Civil War battles. Please, please, please convert South Mountain to IBM format and include it in Run 5 soon. This is a great scenario.

Now, as to your comment regarding the commemoration of the Normandy landing and the Western view of who won the War, I believe that it is very hard to say that any one country was the most important in winning the War. Certainly each country did not make it's decisions on how it would prosecute the war in a vacuum. Firstly the USSR had the benefit of only having to worry about a single front. The western allies had to not only fight in Europe but certainly the U.S. committed a significant amount of resources to the Pacific. What if the Western allies had only Germany to fight? How would things have been different. Could the Western allies in such a case defeat Germany with out Soviet help. Maybe not. Likewise could the Soviets with-

Continued on p.48



# THE LAST BLITZKRIEG

## What Is It?

Designer's Notes by Ian Trout

*Well, what's so different about our new land warfare system? Read on!*

*For the first time, the SSG team put together a game design with two specifications we intended to adhere to at all costs.*

### Integrated Move and Combat Structure

With a game map covering 60 x 50 hexes (at 2 kms to the hex) and a unit manifest of almost 300 brigades, regiments and independent battalions, a major problem for the player - especially in the campaign game - would be organising and coordinating that many troops.

The major problem with any continuous move/fight system is accounting for the time/space relationships that develop when an enemy unit is displaced or eliminated and nearby unengaged friendly units get the chance to exploit. We have addressed that point by allotting each unit an Ops Point allowance as well as an attack capability and these characteristics are adjusted at the beginning of each turn. Units expend OPs to move and their AC to attack. Only one attack is allowed per turn.

Friendly attacks generate a combat residue in the target hex and all adjacent hexes. This adds an OP penalty to

those hexes which lasts for the remainder of the turn and (at a reduced value) into the next turn, restricting movement through them. Furthermore, enemy units generate OP penalties in adjacent hexes which persist only while those units remain in place.

All hexes on the map are either controlled by the Allies, the Axis or contested. Additional OP costs are applied to units moving through enemy or contested hexes. While hex control changes during a turn, the penalty remains in place until the end of the turn.

Bridge repair, air interdiction and German Grief team operations use the same system. Bridge repair is instantaneous

(by engineer units) but an OP penalty is generated on each side of the bridge which persists for two turns, accounting for the inevitable delay and confusion. Each air interdiction mission affects a single road hex and any adjacent road hexes, adding an OP penalty. Grief teams work in much the same way.

The net result is to allow units to move very freely (and long distances) on roads in friendly territory but to find the going much slower when enemy forces are present and/or they are in enemy territory (and hidden enemy units raise their ugly pugs to frustrate deep penetrations.





But the most valuable achievement of this system is ease of play and flexibility. The player's train of thought is not interrupted by a rigid turn structure which forces him to switch focus before a local operation is resolved. Replacements, air interdiction, bridge blowing, motor pool use, air supply; indeed, *all* game functions can be addressed at any time in the player's turn.

## 2. A Player-Friendly Combat System

In contrast to some of our earlier games, TLB makes every effort to provide the player with all the information he needs to make his combat decisions, summarised for his convenience into a single Combat Results Table which displays the range of possible results his attack can achieve.

Only the attacking player makes combat decisions, allowing a smooth structure for e-mail, and/or network play.

Combat results in units losing steps (each regiment usually has 3 steps) and/or the defending unit(s) being required to retreat. Attacking units are never required to retreat. Advance af-

ter combat is not applicable because of the continuous move/fight system.

Factors taken into consideration include

(a). Tactical. This is the most important factor and evaluates the spatial relationship between attacking and defending units. Basically, the more friendly attacking stacks adjacent to the target, the more CRT shifts in the attacker's favour. River hexides negate hexes as do hexes containing other enemy units. In effect, a defensive position with the three regiments from a division in adjacent hexes is about as strong as a position with all three regiments in the same hex.

(b). Divisional Integrity. A percentage increment (separate for attack and defence) applies to individual regiments when they meet the conditions for divisional grouping.

(c). Artillery Support. CRT shifts can be added for the presence of in-range artillery units.

(d). Air Support. A single CRT shift can be added for the presence of a ground

attack mission.

(e). Leaders. Yes, Patton and Manteuffel make an appearance.

(f). Terrain. Each major terrain type has its own range of CRTs.

(g). Unit Density. The number of steps in the defending hex determine the number of times the CRT is consulted in a particular attack.

Of course, plenty of other things have gone into the design.

The bane of all military simulations which have detailed and subtle mechanics available for the player to use is how to get the computer to manipulate them and not look ridiculous. In the past, SSG has addressed the problem by restricting the human player to relatively imprecise mechanics which allow the computer some chance to keep up. Other companies address the problem by enhancing the combat effectiveness of computer controlled forces or simply don't worry too much about it, resulting in woefully inadequate computer play. Sometimes they do both.

Well, now we have to put up or shut up! Building on the experience we gained from the revolutionary AI mechanics we developed for *Carriers at War*, we have produced a more than competent computer opponent. Most importantly, it won't be predictable.

The game interface is easily the best we have done, added no doubt by the availability of 256 colors and 640 by 480 resolution. At any time, the player can call up a variety of information screens and get details on his Order of Battle, the equipment and hardware used by his forces and the historical commanders who led them.

Objectives, exit hexes and supply sources are all clearly marked and your progress is continually monitored by an impatient CinC. I'm sure you'll enjoy it!





## EDITOR'S CHANCE Continued from p. 3

### NEXT ISSUE

*Decisive Battles* moves away from the American Civil War to the desert of the Sudan where in 1898 an Anglo-Egyptian army under Lord Kitchener crushed the Mahdist forces of the Khalifa.

At issue is not whether you can inflict huge casualties on the dominantly spear-armed Moslems but whether you can capture the tomb of the Mahdi. Whether you choose to hurl his body unceremoniously into the Nile (as was done historically) is up to you.

The *Carriers at War* scenario will be a hypothetical engagement in the Coral Sea during 1946. The Japanese have won the War in the Pacific but with Germany defeated the USN is coming back for a second go and intends to hurl the invaders out of their foothold in Northern Australia. Along with this scenario I intend to include a tutorial on how to alter a scenario using the *Carriers at War Construction Kit*.

The 'Book of the Quarter' will be Correlli Barnett's excellent work, *The Desert Generals*.

We will also be including a *Warlords II* scenario from among a number of excellent reader contributions.

### JUST RELEASED

Since the publication of Issue 22 we have released the following games

*Warlords II* (Mac)

*MacArthur's War* (Mac)

At last! Macintosh owners get to play the best selling and highly addictive *Warlords II*. Don't be the only one on your street not to have put the enemy's heads on pikes. *MacArthur's War* is the final game in the *Battlefront* series for the Mac.

### WORK IN PROGRESS

The big project which is consuming all our waking hours is our new World

War II operational level game *The Last Blitzkrieg*. The game will feature a number of scenarios from the Battle of the Bulge such as Bastogne, St Vith, Approaching the Meuse etc. as well as a full campaign game dealing with the entire battle. Each scenario has a situation specific AI, similar to that used in *Carriers at War*. The graphics and interface are by far the best we have ever done and the game is already a joy to play. For those who want to know more, read the article by Ian Trout on the preceding two pages.

### A BLUNDER

Yes, another one. In the last issue one of the data tables for the Monocacy scenario was omitted. It is included below and yes I am a total doghead for leaving it out.

### MONOCACY - Armies

SIDE	N/S	SOUTH	NORTH
COMMANDER	[9]	Early	Wallace
SECOND I.C.	[9]	-	-
ARMY I.D.	[11]	Early's	Washington
	[11]	Corps	Garrison
MAP LOCATION	(x,y)	3,20	16,19
ARRIVAL	0-95	0	0
OFF. OBJ. #1	0-23	3	0
OFF. OBJ. #2	0-23	7	0
DEF. OBJ. #1	0-23	0	3
DEF. OBJ. #2	0-23	0	4
MOVEMENT	0-15	12	10
STAFF	0-7	5	5
STRENGTH	0-7	1	2
LEADERSHIP	0-7	6	5

allies enabling them to hang on until the U.S. was able to get up to speed. Later in the War there was, again, definitely a mutual benefit to the alliance. But, did not the Soviets benefit in another way? With the U.S. and G. B. and your countrymen tying up the Japanese, the Soviets didn't have to worry about Japan until they were good and ready. What if the Soviets had been forced to confront Japan as well as Germany? Who can say what would have happened. And, this is the wonderful thing about history. So many what ifs. Finally, think what might have happened if the U.S. had decided on a Japan first policy. With a decreased presence in Europe and a delayed second front, maybe the second front comes much later but much stronger. Once again we can only speculate. Admittedly the Soviet gambit for Hitler was ill advised. I disagree with your colleagues who say there is no way Germany could have defeated the USSR. Look down through history for any number of things that have happened that nobody would have thought possible - for example, the way revolutionary France held out against all the various coalitions, U.S. debacle in Vietnam and the best example I can think of, the U.S. winning the gold medal in ice hockey in 1980! All of this just to say who knows what might have happened had not the first brutal winter blunted the German onslaught etc., etc.


Finally, I am sorry to go on so long, but as to the letter regarding comparison of Patton and Monty, I will tell you what friend of mine who I met in Normandy at the 1984 commemoration thinks. Ron, (who I met at Pegasus Cafe) served in the Royal Sussex in WWII and while he did not comment on Patton, he has said many a time that he did not like Monty. According to Ron, Monty only cared about himself, not his men. Ron said he had a great place in his heart for Ike. "Ike cared." By the way, saw Ron at this years anniversary and we shared a beer at Pegasus again while we watched the Canadian and Brits do a jump by the bridge!

Joe Sherfy

## LETTERS Continued from p. 45

out Western help have defeated Germany. Again, I would say may be not. In the beginning of the war the Soviets benefited from a significant commitment from the western allies in the form of supplies and equipment (and the fact that G. B. was still hanging on). Was this decisive in keeping the USSR alive? Quite possibly. In the middle of the War the growing Soviet strength was a very great help to the Western





# Warlords II

*Warlords II is the sequel to the highly addictive, hugely successful, award winning Warlords. . .*

*Now, Warlords II gives you more of everything. More worlds to conquer, more mighty armies to make, more enemies to vanquish. . . all displayed in fabulous, hi-res graphics and backed by a full sound track. . .*


*Warlords II features include random worlds for infinite playability, mysterious hidden maps, exciting and dangerous quests, new, exotic army types, and the smartest computer opponents you'll ever encounter. . .*



Screen shots are from the IBM and Mac versions

To purchase *Warlords II*, visit your local retailer or call SSG Inc on 904- 469-8880 (fax 904-469-8885) in North America or call SSG P/L on 02-819-7199 (fax 02-819-7737) if you live anywhere else. RRP for the IBM and Macintosh (Color Only) versions is \$US 70.00 (North America) or \$AUD 85.00 (Australia and elsewhere)





# Warlords II

## Scenario Builder



Following your legendary conquests in Warlords II comes a new power... Power to create worlds! Power to populate them with fierce races and mythical heroes. Power to build awesome weapons of war, and to use them in epic battles.

This easy-to-use Scenario Builder allows you to invent your own Warlords II scenarios. Design new maps, armies and cities! Become the sculptor of worlds!

Explore 24 new scenarios with exciting army, city and terrain sets! Power on this scale guarantees satisfaction!

IBM PC (VGA, 640K)  
1.4MB 387 (2MB, 386SX processor or better)  
2MB Expanded/Expanded RAM, Mouse and  
Hard Disk Required. Supports AdLib, Sound  
Blaster, TMS, MT32, Sound Cards.

The Warlords II game is required to use this product



Screen shots are from the IBM version

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